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BRHADÂRANYAKÔPANISHAD

PART I.

WITH THE COMMENTARY

OF

Sri Sankaracharya



Translated into English

BY

M. HIRIYANNA, M. A.

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SRIRANGAM :

SRI VANI VILAS PRESS.

1919

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NOTE.

There are two very useful aids to the correct understanding of the *Bhāṣya* on the *Brhadaranyaka-Upanishad*, viz., Suresvarāchārya's *Vārtikas* and Vidyāranya's *Vārtikasāra*. Both these works have been consulted in translating, in addition to Ānandagiri's *Tīkā*. The foremost aim of the Translation, as in the case of previous volumes of the series, has been, the faithful reproduction in English of the thoughts of Śaṅkarāchārya.

I have to express my sincere gratitude to Mr. D. Venkataramiah B.A., L.T., Principal, Training College, Mysore, who has kindly read the whole translation in proof and given me several useful suggestions.

1919

M. H.

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INTRODUCTION.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇishad*, as its name implies, is the biggest of the Upanishads. It deals with a large number of topics and its importance to a student of *advaita* is greatly increased by the fact that Sankarāchārya in his commentary upon it has exhaustively treated the various problems which arise in *Upanishadic* philosophy. The Upanishad belongs to the *Suklayajurveda* and is in two recensions—the *Mādhyandina* and the *Kāṇva*; but the difference between the two texts is very slight. It is the latter recension that is commented upon by Sankara.

The Upanishad consists really of eight *Adhyāyas* or chapters, being eight out of the one hundred chapters of the *Suklayajurveda-Brāhmaṇa*, which for that reason is known as *Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa*. The first two chapters, however, are not concerned with self-knowledge and have not accordingly been commented upon. Each of the *Adhyāyas* is divided into sections called *Brāhmaṇas* and the first three *Brāhmaṇas* of the third *Adhyāya* or of the first—regarding the Upanishad as consisting only of six chapters—are here presented in English translation. Before

dealing with the subject-matter of these *Brahma-nas*, it is necessary to refer briefly to the topics of a preliminary nature which the *Bhāshyakdra* discusses in his Introduction. These are chiefly two:—

- (i) The first topic relates to the means by which the survival of the individual self after death can be known. The *Vedāntin* maintains, as against the *Mīmāṃsaka*, that the self's survival can be known for certain only through revealed authority. His argument in support of this position is simple. If the survival of the self is not known through revelation, it must be known either through perception or inference. It cannot be perception because, if the fact of its survival could be perceived, there would be no difference of opinion regarding it. Nothing that is perceivable remains the subject of doubt after close scrutiny. Nor can the self's survival of the body be made out from inference, for inference being naturally based on experience, is not entitled to be heard in a matter which refers to a period after this life and is therefore necessarily

beyond experience. Natural reason can, at best, only suggest the *probability* of the conclusion that the self survives the body; but for a *positive* knowledge of it we must depend upon revelation and revelation alone. We may, in passing, point out the importance of the view here set forth. According to the *Mīmāṃsaka* the function of the Scriptures stops short at the prescribing of rites; but according to the *Vedāntin* it becomes much exalted, being nothing less than the communication of the deepest spiritual truths.

- (ii) The second topic relates to the mutual relation of the *karma*- and *jñāna-kāṇḍas* of the Veda. Sankarāchārya often dwells on this subject in his commentaries. For example, in the introduction to the *Iṣāvāsyōpanishad* he shows how *karma*, by aiding the purification of the heart (*sattva-suddhi*), serves as a preliminary to the acquisition of right knowledge and the realisation of the self. Here it is another aspect of the same subject that is touched upon. The

karma- and *jñāna-kāṇḍas* both imply a self surviving the body and are accordingly significant only for those that believe in such a self. Some among these believers may be actuated by selfish desires ; and for such is meant the *karma-kāṇḍa*. Others again, although ignorant of the true character of the self, may yet feel convinced that selfish activity can bring only misery in its train. The *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is intended to enlighten such in regard to the truth about the self and enable them to free themselves from the bondage of life.

First and Second Brahmanas.

The first two *Brahmanas* are taken up with the subject of meditating upon the horse-sacrifice. Meditation or *upāsana*, as it is termed, is a process of mentally identifying one's self with the object meditated upon—a process not merely of *thinking about* it but actually *becoming* it in imagination.¹ Such a process naturally consists of two stages—the first one of *concentration* in which the mind is abstracted entirely from everything but the

1. Vide *Bhāṣya* on iii, 9. p. 92.

object of meditation; and the second one of sympathetic *imagination* in which union with that object is actually experienced. There is nothing unsound or illegitimate in this exercise, for according to the Vedānta, the difference between one thing and another is formal and nominal, reality being equally present in all. The aim of the *Vedāntin* is to attain to this reality underlying all things by effacing external differences and *upāsanas* rightly serve as exercises preliminary to such attainment. Practice in *upāsanas* leads to the cultivation of two habits of invaluable help in the struggle for spirituality—the intellectual one of intense concentration and the emotional one of feeling akin to objects usually regarded as outside oneself.

And now as regards the meditation itself. It has three phases of which the first two are in the nature of auxiliaries to the third or the chief meditation upon the *Asvamedha*. In each case the meditation consists in mentally identifying the object meditated upon with *Virāj* which is in effect the *Vedāntic* term for the universe as a whole. The meditations upon the horse and the *Agni*, by which term has here to be understood the sacrificial altar, form part of the *Asvamedha* rite as well; and the sacrificer who identifies himself with either of these, through an effort of will, rises above the ordinary life of narrowness. But here

the imagination is stretched still further, for the devotee has to contemplate himself as one with the universe. He also performs the sacrifice but only subjectively—as a mere mental operation; and the object sacrificed, the god propitiated and the result attained are all himself viewed as not distinct from the whole. In other words the meditation on the *Asvamedha* is an exercise in losing the narrow self to gain the wider one.

A person that succeeds in this exercise consciously lives a universal life ignoring individual concerns. He rises from a feeling of separateness and dependence to a feeling of unity. But the unity that he experiences includes differences and does not efface them. He has no doubt discovered the interrelation between part and whole; but he has not yet risen from the notion of *appearance* to that of *reality*; for in truth there are no parts at all and the whole is integral and one. He is therefore still unenlightened in regard to the true character of the self. He is still under the spell of *avidyā* and is an *anātmajña*. And until self-enlightenment is attained through the dispelling of *avidyā* he cannot escape from the endless whirl of transmigration. It is this enlightenment that forms the aim of the Upanishad. The above consideration enables us to discover why this meditation is mentioned in the beginning of the Upanishad. The *Asvamedha* sacrifice is the

highest of rites and its fruit may be reaped either by performing it in the ordinary manner or by meditating upon it.* But that result is not final deliverance which can be secured only by right knowledge, the subject-matter of the Upanishads. Thus these two *Brāhmaṇas* serve as a connecting link between the ritualistic section and the knowledge section and are intended to suggest the excellence of *jñāna* as compared with *karma* or *upāsana*.

We have in the *bhāṣya* on Passage 1 of the second *Brāhmaṇa*, a discussion on the nature of effects in general. Sankara begins this discussion by controverting the view of the nihilist who does not recognise the causal relation at all and believes that whatever is produced, is produced from nothing. This belief the nihilist bases upon the commonly accepted notion that the cause† must of necessity exist *just* prior to the production of

*This belief that meditation yields the same result as the performance of the sacrifice marks an important stage in the development of Vedic religion. It implies that religious life is its own proof and does not require any outward sign to bear witness to it, for religion primarily is a matter of will and feeling activity. We probably find here the step which eventually led to the doctrine that *jñāna* is the *sole* means of liberation.

†By this term is here to be understood the 'material cause' unless otherwise qualified.

the effect. He says that the pot, for instance, which is an effect, comes into existence *after* destroying its cause,—the lump of clay; and that consequently the effect is produced only in the absence of the cause. The flaw in this argument, as pointed out in the commentary, arises from a misapprehension of what the cause really is. The cause of the pot is not the *lump* of clay as has been naively assumed by the nihilist but the *material* or *substance* clay; and although the lump may be destroyed before the pot is produced, the substance—clay—is there and it will not therefore do to regard the pot as produced from nothing. The lump also is an effect or mode of the clay and the production of the pot does not involve the destruction of its cause but only the destruction of some one of its other effects.

Forced thus to admit the existence of clay immediately before the production of the pot, the nihilist who regards everything as momentary asks what guarantee there is that the material clay endures in the effect and is the same after its production as before. The clay that constitutes the cause, he contends, may well be different from, although similar to, the clay in the effect. The commentator remarks that the identity of the clay in the two is vouched by perception and that any other supposition by striking at the very root of permanence would put an end to all the activities of life.

Having thus shown the necessity for the causal relation, Sankara proceeds to discuss the nature of the effect by asking whether it is produced or only manifested. If the effect is *produced*, it is temporary in character; if, on the other hand, it is *manifested*, it is permanent and persists always in some form or other. Each of these views is held by one or other of the various schools of Hindu philosophy. The former is called the *asat-kārya-vāda* and is prominently associated with the *Nyāya*; and the latter is known as the *sat-kārya-vāda* and is similarly associated with the *Sāṅkhya*. A little inquiry will show that these opposing theories are closely connected with fundamental differences between the systems in interpreting the inner character of the sensible world. Both *Nyāya* and *Sāṅkhya* are realistic inasmuch as they, besides postulating the existence of an eternal and independent sentient principle, recognise that the physical universe is a reality. But they differ widely in their ultimate conception of what that reality is. While the one regards it as multiform, the other views it as unitary:—

- (i.) According to the *Naiyāyika* hypothesis, the universe, at bottom, is diverse in character, its ultimate constituents being atoms of different orders possessing varied characteristics but all supersensuous and therefore in-

visible and intangible. These atoms, under the influence of extraneous causes, unite to form the various visible and tangible objects of our experience. The effect thus becomes an aggregate of its causes and is yet supposed to exhibit characteristics other than those belonging to its parts.* Starting with such an hypothesis, the *Naiyāyika* cannot but introduce novelty into the effect and explain the whole as distinct from the parts constituting it;† for otherwise the disparity between cause and effect will remain unexplained. Having first broken up reality, the *Naiyāyika* is obliged to create it anew.

(ii.) According to the *Sāṅkhya* hypothesis,

*The *Naiyāyika* recognises mere mechanical aggregates also as for example a heap of bricks; but the existence of such aggregates is here ignored as not being relevant when talking of creation from atoms. There can be no heap of atoms.

†The parts are stated to be in mechanical relation (*samyoga*), one with the other while they, taken collectively, bear a different and a more intimate kind of relation (*samavāya*) to the whole. Thus the distinctness of the whole is explained by postulating a unique, almost mysterious, relationship known as *samavāya*.

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on the other hand, the underlying feature of the physical universe is unity; and, instead of the varied atoms of the *Naiḍyika*, we have here, as the ultimate result of investigation, the *pradhāna*, a single and self-dependent continuum which, although itself undifferentiated, is complex in its nature and possesses the capacity to develop into the infinite variety of the universe. In other words we have here, not creation (*ārambha*), but evolution (*pariṇāma*); and an effect is not an aggregate of parts, somehow united, but the result of continuous growth in a single substance. This self-containing *pradhāna*, evolves practically* without any external aid, so that there can be nothing in the effect which was not already latent in the cause. 'Cause' and 'effect' are merely relative terms applied respectively to the prior and later stages of the same evolving substance; and the distinction be-

*Theoretically the '*puruṣha*' or 'soul' must be looking on if the *pradhāna* should evolve.

tween these terms accordingly turns out to be only formal, not substantial.

The various systems of Hindu philosophy, as already stated, fall into line with one or the other of these two extreme views. The *Vedāntin* sides with the *Sāṅkhya* and to him, as to the *Sāṅkhya*, the effect pre-exists its manifestation. The agreement of the *Vedāntin* with the *Sāṅkhya* should, however, be understood with a qualification.* On the empirical plane, the *Vedāntin* also speaks of the clay as the cause of the pot (*pariṇāmyupādāna*); but ultimately the clay to him is as much an effect as the pot, both being alike the illusory appearance of Brahman, the common ground (*vivartopādāna*) of all. Cause and effect are both phenomenal and each possesses its essence in and through Brahman. In other words they have no existence apart from Brahman. When 'cause' and 'effect' are understood in this special sense, the *Vedāntin* can side with neither the *Naiyāyika* nor the *Sāṅkhya*. He cannot say with the former that the effect does not exist before its production because its essence, the substratum, always exists. Nor can he say with the latter that the effect exists before it is produced, for the effect itself is illusory and never *really* exists. Thus according to the *Vedāntin* the

*This aspect of the question is not discussed in the text but elsewhere. Vide Com: on *Br: Sūtras*: II, i, 14—20.

effect is neither created nor manifested. It is illusory, by which the *Vedāntin* means that the question about the nature of effect is not of ultimate significance. Real unity with apparent diversity is his explanation here as elsewhere. This is the *vivartavāda* of the *Vedāntin* as distinguished from the *parināma-vāda* of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *ārambha-vāda* of the *Naiyāyika*.

Third Brahmana.

The subject-matter of the third *Brahmana* also is meditation, but this time it is meditation upon *Prāṇa*. But what is *Prāṇa*? To understand this we must find out what, according to the Vedānta is the outfit of the individual self or *jīva* for passing through life and experiencing the good and bad that may be the result of its past deeds according to the law of *karma*. Broadly speaking the *jīva*, as long as it maintains its individuality, is endowed with two faculties which are known as *buddhi* and *prāṇa* and of which all the powers possessed by it are only varieties. *Buddhi* stands for the principle of conscious life and *prāṇa*, for the principle of non-conscious life. We see, hear, touch, taste and smell. We possess motor activity as a result of volitional impulse. All this is the

result of our possessing *buddhi*. Again we inhale and exhale air; we digest the food we eat and the blood circulates through our body. All this non-conscious activity—not the less necessary because it is non-conscious—is due to our possessing *prāṇa*. This is the fundamental significance of *prāṇa* although it is also used in a variety of other senses in the Upanishads. One special feature of *prāṇa*, thus understood, forms the central point of the parable in this *Brāhmaṇa*. All the senses and other vital organs, no doubt, function for the sake of the whole system and thus contribute to self-preservation. But over and above this contribution to the general well-being, these organs operate in a manner which cannot be regarded as ministering directly to the welfare of the whole. The eye, *e.g.* sees and thus protects the body from possible destruction which might arise in its absence. But this organ can attain to special excellence in seeing, in virtue of which one's eyes are judged to be superior to those of another. This extra excellence ministers directly, not to self-preservation, but only to self-gratification. Again in the case of the sense of taste, the food that is eaten contributes to the upkeep of the body; but the organ of taste seeks its own gratification also. *Prāṇa* on the other hand, exhibits no such selfish propensities

and all its functions are directed solely towards the maintenance of the bodily system as a whole. This entire unselfishness of *prāṇa* is utilised in an allegorical manner to impress the vast importance of leading a disinterested life.

Hitherto we have considered only the psychic *prāṇa* housed in the microcosmic body; but, in agreement with the general scheme of the Vedānta, there is also the cosmic *Prāṇa* which is the totality of the various psychic *prāṇas*. It is this cosmic *Prāṇa** that is the subject of meditation in this *Brāhmaṇa*. When the devotee succeeds in identifying himself with this cosmic principle, he becomes unselfish and therefore sinless and deathless. Selfishness is the only sin and the only source of death and when that is overcome there is no sin and no death. In other words this *upāsana* leads to a feeling of oneness with the universe—a result which is, in effect† the same as that to be attained by the meditation as taught in the first two *Brāhmaṇas*.

*Otherwise known as *Hiranyagarbha*. He is characterised both by *buddhi-sakti* or *jñāna-sakti* and *prāṇa-sakti* or *kriya-sakti*. In this meditation the latter aspect is regarded as essential.

†The only difference is that while the identity there is with the sensible universe (or *Virāj*, the deity presiding over it), here it is with the subtle universe (or *Hiranyagarbha*, the deity presiding over it)—the logically prior stage of the sensible universe.

We have a pretty long discussion in the *bhāshya* on Passage 1 of this *Brāhmaṇa* which finally turns upon a point of ethical importance and discloses to us what the conception of 'duty' according to the *advaita* is. The significance which any system of thought attaches to the term 'duty' naturally depends upon what, according to that system, constitutes right (*dharma*) and wrong (*adharma*) or to use a single Sanskrit term for both, '*karma*'. What the Vedantic criterion of *dharma* and *adharma* is, is however too large a subject for discussion here and we shall accordingly content ourselves with mentioning two points about 'duty' as can be understood from the discussion in question.

The first point emerging from the discussion is that all duty is regarded as a means to an end and not as an end in itself. Desire is the basis of duty as it is the basis of the rest of our actions. This teaching that duty hinges on desire and that its performance is directed towards the attainment of an end makes *advaita* on its moral side, utilitarian; but not, however, in its commonly accepted sense as the following consideration will show. The object aimed at in *all* the duties is *the same*, viz., the cleansing of the mind or the purification of the heart--*sattvasuddhi*, as it is called—which qualifies for self-realisation, the highest good of man. There is a tendency inherent in human nature to yield to selfish or natural

impulses which is termed *durita* and which hinders man from striving whole-heartedly for the attainment of spirituality. It is the removal of this *durita* that is termed *sattvasuddhi*—a result which is negative in character and has no direct bearing whatever upon material well-being. If we still describe the *Vedantic* conception of duty as utilitarian, we use that epithet in its widest sense as comprehending all cases which involve the pursuit of an end. The end here is self-discipline, such as is calculated to serve as an aid to a correct knowledge of one's own self.

The appeal made here to a spiritual goal in explaining duty should not be regarded as rendering it exclusively religious and therefore speculative and unpractical. For the duties enjoined in the Hindu *Sāstras* are of various kinds and while there are those which are religious, there are also others, such as the duty we owe to our parents, which are of immediate practical significance. The one set of duties being quite as binding as the other, the Vedanta cannot be said to be concerned exclusively with religious duties. Rather it raises even secular duty to the level of the religious by investing it with a spiritual meaning and laying special emphasis on it.

As may be gathered from the discussion on the passage we are considering, there is also a

second point about 'duty.' Every deed is ordinarily designed to yield a specific result, but any good deed (*vihiṭa karma*), according to the Vedānta, can be transformed into a duty, if the doer entirely shifts his thoughts from its specific result and performs it with the deliberate view of securing the common end of all duty, viz., *duritakṣaya* or *sattvasuddhi*. In the phraseology of the Vedānta all *kāmyakarmas* may become *nityakarmas* and much of the daily life of the Hindu is, in theory, based upon the principle of performing *kāmyakarmas* as *nityakarmas*.^{*} All that he does, he ought to do, not for securing the worldly benefit which it may yield, but merely from 'a sense of duty.' Thus motive becomes the guiding factor and whether an act is a duty or no lies not in the act itself but in the intention of the doer. The deed as such is immaterial; the spirit in which it is done is what counts. In ethical discussions a great deal is heard about motives or consequences being the real criterion of morality. Obviously in a system of ethics predominantly collectivist the consequences of our actions should loom large; but in a system like the Vedānta which is predominantly individualistic, it is not difficult to see why so much

^{*}This is *nishkāma-karma* and it is this art of doing the usual and yet deriving from it an unusual result that is extolled in the *Bhagavadgīta* as '*karmasu kausālam*'—'wisdom in action' (ii 50).

importance should attach to motive. It should, however, be remembered that *Vedāntic* ethics is individualistic in no narrow selfish sense but only in the sense that its fundamental motive is individual perfection*.

We have thus two classes of duties to distinguish—one which we may term 'obligatory duties' which should in any case be performed and whose only result is the negative one of removing *durita*; the other which we may term 'voluntary duties' whose performance is left to our option and which yield over and above the removal of *durita*, a positive result, although it is at no stage thought of by the doer. The deed itself when once performed must yield its result; only the doer's thoughts are not occupied with it, his attitude towards it being such that he would perform it even if the particular circumstances in

*We must here make a distinction between *dharma* and what is only one of its several forms—'duty.' The *Vedāntic* conception of 'duty' is individualistic, but that of *dharma* is not. The very expression '*varṇāśrama-dharma*' implies that it is based on and is intended to contribute to the upkeep of social organisation or 'civic cohesion'. Even the former is not altogether individualistic, for we cannot overlook the influence, although it be indirect, upon society of a person that steadfastly pursues his ideal of duty, and thereby serves as an example to others. He will be to them like a light illumining their path.

which he is acting would lead to harm in the immediate* future. And it is here that the common saying—'Duty for duty's sake'—is significant. The immediate result, whatever it may be, is in his eyes a consequent, but never the end. The neglect of the first class of duties which are obligatory is followed by an evil result known as *pratyavāya* or sin which is nothing but a defilement of the moral consciousness unfitting a man the more for self-realisation. The failure to undertake the second class of duties which are voluntary can have no such evil result.†

*Its ultimate result can never be harmful for it serves as an aid to *sattva-suddhi* or self-conquest.

†It follows as a corollary from the above that if we can conceive of a person who is spiritually pure and has secured *sattva-suddhi* by overcoming *durita*, no duty can be binding upon him. An ideal *sannyāsin* is such a person and that is why according to the *advaita*, *sannyāsins* are exempt from the performance of all duty' or *nitya-karma*.

BRHADÂRANYAKÔPANISHAD

WITH THE COMMENTARY

OF

SRI SANKARÂCHÂRYA.

FIRST BRÂHMAṆA.

Om! Adoration to *Brahman* and other ancient sages who have successively handed down *Brahma-knowledge*. Adoration to (our) revered teacher.

The (chapters) beginning with 'The dawn is the head of the sacrificial horse' (constitute) what is known as the *Vâjasaneyibrahmaṇopanishad*¹. We begin this brief² commentary on it in order that those who are intent on ridding themselves of mundane existence may acquire what is the means of removing its root-cause—the knowledge that

1. I. e. the *Upanishad* which forms part of the *Vajasaneyi- or śathapatha-brâhmaṇa* of the *śuklayajurveda*.

2. 'Brief' as compared with an older commentary by *Bhartrprapancha*. (A.)

Brahman and the self are identical. This knowledge is what is signified by 'Upanishad', and, as implied by the etymology of this word (*upa + ni + sad*), it once for all *destroys*, in the case of those that devote themselves whole-heartedly to it, the cycle of existence together with the cause that leads to it. The treatise also is termed *Upanishad* (in a secondary sense) for it serves as an aid in acquiring that knowledge¹. This *Upanishad* which consists of six chapters is styled an *āranyaka* because it is to be studied in the forest. The epithet *bṛhat* is in reference to its size.²

We shall (now) indicate its relation to (the earlier portion of the Veda known as) the *Karmakānda*—the section relating to rites. The whole of the Veda is for making known the means—such only as cannot be known through perception or inference—of attaining good or avoiding evil; for all men are naturally interested in knowing how the one can be attained and the other avoided³. In regard

1. See *Kāthakopaniṣad* pp. 1-3.

2. Commentators point out that this *Upanishad* is described as *bṛhat* because its teaching is weighty. Compare *Bṛhatvāt granthatorthāccha bṛhadāranyakam smṛtam.*—*Vārtikasāra* i, 2. Another reason for the epithet is that the treatment is exhaustive.

3. *Ānandagiri* suggests that this natural desire to obtain happiness and avoid misery, *in general*, implies that man, all-unconsciously though it be, strives after reaching everlasting bliss or *mōksha*, and that a teaching which

to empirical matters, the securing of good and the avoidance of evil being possible with the aid of perception and inference, there is no need to seek (the assistance of) revealed knowledge¹. If one has no belief in the existence of a *transmigrating* self, one will not desire either to secure good or to avoid evil in the life to come. The materialists, for instance, (who do not believe in a self apart from the body and the mind are not seen to engage themselves in Vedic rites.) Thus (it must be admitted that) the Veda has to do not only with the varied means of attaining good or avoiding evil in a future life, but also with (establishing) the existence of a self which survives after death. As instances of the Veda dealing with the existence of a self, independent of the body, we may mention

appeals to this universal yearning and shows the way to satisfy it, is necessarily right.

1. The connection between the *Jñāna*- and *Karma-kāndas* is explained after first establishing, as against the view held by the *Mīmāṃsakas*, that the testimony of the Veda is valid in regard to matters other than ritual also. The substance of the argument here set forth is that even the *Mīmāṃsaka* who believes that the Veda is an authority *only* in regard to *karma*—something which has to be done and not what already exists—must grant that belief in the efficacy of *karma* involves a belief in the existence of a transmigrating self. This latter belief (as will be shown later on) is altogether founded upon Vedic teaching so that the Veda is an authority in matters pertaining to existing things as well.

the following¹:—*Kāth. Up.* i, 19; v, 12; v, 6 and 7; *Br. Up.* II, i and IV, iii and iv.

(*Question.*) Is not belief in the existence of the self a result of perception.

(*Answer.*) No; for there is difference of opinion about it among disputants. If the existence of a transmigrating self were known through perception, materialists and Buddhists would not be our opponents denying the soul altogether. In the case of a pot, for example, which is perceived by the senses, nobody maintains that it does not exist.

(*Objection.*) A post is by some mistaken (in the dusk) for a man and you cannot therefore say (that there cannot at all be any difference of opinion regarding perceivable objects.)

(*Answer.*) No; for in the example you give the doubt disappears when careful observation is made. Surely nobody entertains any doubt about a post even after examining it². The Buddhist

1. The very fact that the Veda prescribes actions which are to bear fruit hereafter implies that it inculcates belief in a transmigrating self. But, apart from this indirect teaching, the Veda deals directly with the matter and the instances cited are of such direct teaching.

2. Even when doubt is felt as regards a post, it is only of a partial character; for we recognise that some-

(on the other hand), although he experiences the ego, maintains there is no soul other than the subtle body¹. Thus—owing to its diverseness² from objects perceived by the senses—the self cannot be proved to exist by perception. Neither is its existence deducible from reasoning³.

thing is perceived. The doubt is only as regards its exact character—whether it is a post or a man. In the case of the self, on the other hand, absolute denial is found to be made.

1. The previous observation means that the soul cannot be known, through perception, to be different from the gross body; and the present one, that it is not different from the subtle body. The former view denies the soul altogether, while the latter admits the ego but identifies it with the subtle body which here stands for the mind, the chief of its constituents. *Déhāntaram śhūladéhātiriktaṃ sūkṣhamam. Tatra pradhānabhūtāya buddheratiriktaśyātmanō nāstitvameva paśyanti.* (A.)

2. What is meant is that the self possesses none of the characteristics like form or colour which render objects perceivable by the senses. Compare *Kath: Up: iii, 15.*

3. The reasoning here alluded to is thus stated by the *Tikākhāra*:—‘Desire and the like which are qualities like form, for instance, are necessarily dependent in their character. They thus imply the existence of something upon which they depend or to which they belong. This something is the self.’ The fallacy in this argument is what is known as ‘begging the question’. We assume that the soul exists when we premise that desire and the like are qualities and are dependent in their character. There is

(*Objection.*) (You cannot say that the self is established *solely* by Vedic testimony) inasmuch as the Veda itself points to facts¹ leading to the inference that the self exists and these facts are perceived by the senses.

(*Answer.*) Not so; for the connection of one and the same self with different lives is not perceived by the senses². The existence of the self is (really) known through the authority of the Veda—helped³ by empirical facts cited therein; and the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the rationalists borrowing their belief from the Veda, fancy that the

besides the possibility of desire and so forth being features of the mind and they need not therefore prove the existence of the soul.

1. Compare for example, *Kēnopanishad* i, 9.

2. It is admitted that the Veda cites these facts, but they cannot by themselves establish the existence of the self for they all refer to empirical phenomena and cannot therefore definitely establish anything about what is beyond experience. They are all in the character of analogies intended to give a 'conjectural insight' into the truth, and are not to be regarded as proofs inviolable for the existence of the self (A.)

3. The conjunction *cha* has not a co-ordinate force here. It has here what is termed an *anvāchayārtha*. The usual example given in illustration of this use of *cha* is—*Bhikshāmata*; *gām chānaya*. The leading of the cow home is not the main object of going out; it is only of an incidental character.

self is both perceivable and inferable and assign as reasons therefor the very reasons given in the Veda (for indicating the *probability* of) the existence of the self and represent these reasons as the result of their own independent reflection.

The *Karmakāṇḍa* was begun for the sake of instructing such as believe that, in any case¹, there is a transmigrating self and consequently desire to know in detail the means of securing good and avoiding evil when that self comes to assume a different body. But the ignorance in respect of the self which causes the desire for attaining good and avoiding evil and is of the nature of supposing that the self is an agent and an enjoyer, has not (as yet) been removed by means of knowledge relating to the true character of Brahman which is but the self. Until this ignorance is removed, man will, prompted by natural impulses², such as love and hatred of the fruits

1. It is here assumed for the sake of argument that the existence of the self may be based on grounds other than Vedic testimony, for the point to be explained here is the relation of the *Jñānakāṇḍa* to the *Karmakāṇḍa*. The reference to the nature of the authority for believing in a transmigrating self was only incidental. The *siddhānta*, however, it should be remembered, is that the existence of such a self is *solely* based on Vedic authority.

2. *Dōṣhānām svābhāvikaṭvam śāstrānapekṣhatvam.* (A.)

of action, transgress the law, in spite of explicit scriptural injunctions—prescriptive and prohibitive—and abundantly accumulate, in thought, word and deed, *karma*¹ which is termed *adhārma* or sin and which leads to evil both here and elsewhere; for nature's evil propensities are (generally) strong. Hence he descends in the scale of beings down to a plant. If, perchance, the influence of scriptural teaching is stronger², then through thought &c., he acquires plentifully what is known as *dharma* or merit which results in good. This (*karma*) is two-fold—that which is accompanied by meditation and that which stands by itself. Of these, *karma*, when by itself, yields as its fruit the world of the manes and so forth³; when accompanied by meditation, it leads to a result which takes one from the world of the gods right up to the world of *Hiranyagarbha*. Compare:—'He who sacrifices to the self is superior to him who sacrifices to the gods'⁴; 'Vedic *karma* is.

1. The word *karma* is used in a great many senses. Here it means 'the result of action.'

2. Remove the stop after *baliyastvam*.

3. *Tasmin phale nānātvamabhiprētya ādiṣabdal.* (A.) All conditions except *mōksha* are vitiated by gradation and difference.

4. *Sarvatra paramātmabhāvanāpurassaram nityam karmānutiṣṭhannātmayājī. Kāmanāpurassaram devānyajamānaḥ devayājī.* (A) The former is the 'path of radiance', leading one to *Kramamukti*; the latter is what is known as

two-fold¹. When merit and demerit are equal one is born as a man. Thus transmigration—from (the position of) *Hiranyagarbha* down to (the condition of) a plant,—which is the result of merit and demerit and is based on name, form and action is (only) for a person² that has natural deficiencies such as *avidyā*³. This same universe which is (now) manifest and consists of means and ends was in an undeveloped condition before creation. Transmigration which is caused by *avidyā* in the sense that the sprout is caused by the seed⁴ and which falsely associates (the self) with actions, (their) accessories and results, is a beginningless and endless evil. For such as realise this and turn away from it, is meant this *Upanishad* which removes that nescience by

the *Dharmamarga* and involves a return to mortal nature. See Śath : Br : XI, ii, 6, 14 and Introduction to *Kath* : Up : pp, ii and iii.

1. *Pravṛttam cha nivṛttam cha dvividham karma vaidikam. Iha vāmutra vā kāmyam pravṛttam karma kīrtiyate. Nishkāmam jñānapūrvam tu nivṛttam abhidhīyate.*—*Manu*. xii, 88.

2. Read *dōshavataḥ* instead of *dōshavati*.

3. These are *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāgaḥ*, *dvēṣaḥ* and *abhiniveśaḥ* known as the *pañchaklēśas*. (*Yogasūtra*.)

4. This illustration is for showing how a beginningless thing may yet be spoken of as being caused. The seed is in a sense the source of the sprout ; but, in reality, the connection between the two is what is described as *anādi*.

inculcating what is opposed to it viz., Brahma-knowledge.

The object of the following meditation upon the horse-sacrifice is that those who are not entitled to perform that sacrifice might obtain its fruit by meditating upon it in the manner described here¹. (That meditation upon a rite yields identically the same result as the performance of the rite) is clear from texts which make meditation alternative with *karma*². Compare also what occurs later on in this *Upanishad* (I, iii, 28)—‘That verily wins worlds.’

(*Objection*). This meditation but forms part of a rite (and is not intended to be practised independently).

(*Answer*). No, for the scripture gives option when it declares ‘Whoever performs a horse-sacrifice or who meditates upon it (will overcome all evil).’ Moreover this meditation is mentioned in the section bearing upon knowledge (and not in

1. The horse sacrifice is to be performed only by kings holding imperial sway. The position attained by performing this sacrifice is of the highest kind that *karma* can give viz., identity with *Virāj*. If the same position is desired by others, say, by Brahmins, they may get it by meditating on the sacrifice as detailed here.

2. See, for instance,
Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa III, ix, 22.

that on *karma*). In the case of certain other rites also similar meditations are prescribed, so that we learn that the fruit of a rite is obtained also by meditation. The horse-sacrifice is the highest of all rites¹, securing as it does identity with the universe—both collectively and individually². The reference to this meditation here, at the beginning of the knowledge-section is for indicating that all *karma* (including even the highest) leads only to transmigration. Accordingly the result (of the meditation) is later on stated to be desire or death.

(*Objection*). (It may be so in regard to *kāmyakarmas*) but (*nityakarmas*³ cannot lead to transmigration (because they satisfy no desire but are yet performed because they are prescribed in the Veda).

1. Compare—*Brahmahatyāṣvamedhābhyām na param puṇyapāpayok.*

2. *Virāj* or the deity presiding over the universe, in its manifest form, feels attachment alike for the whole and for the parts constituting it. *Hiranyagarbha* is the subtle form of *Virāj*. Both are *jivās* and are the victims of *māyā* owing to the bondage of *karma*. The Creator who is known as *Chaturmukha-Brahman* is different. He is an aspect of *īśvara* and, as such, is not a *jīva*. He is above *māyā*.

3. This must be taken to include *naimittika karmas* or rites performed when an occasion arises for them e. g. Bathing when the sun or the moon is eclipsed.

(Answer). Not so, for *all karma* is declared to result in fruit. For all karma is performed with the assistance of the wife¹. 'Let me have a wife; all this is for fulfilling desire' (*Br: Up: I, iv, 17*)—by this, the scripture shows how all *karma* is, in its very nature, interested. It then mentions this world, the world of the manes and that of the gods as the respective fruits of begetting a son, performing *karma* and pursuing lower knowledge (*i.e.*, meditation) and concludes by stating thus the three-fold character of all aids to *karma*—'This is verily name, form and action' (*Br: Up: I, vi, 1*)—a statement the import of which is that all *karma* results in transmigration. This triad was before creation, in an undeveloped form. Through the *karma* of beings, it again developed as a tree does from the seed. The universe—in its developed and undeveloped stages, in its concrete and abstract elements, gross or subtle²—is the result of *avidyā* and, as a result

1. Among *nityakarmas* there are, no doubt, some *smārta* rites like the *sandhyāvandanam* which are performed without the aid of the wife. But there are many *nitya śrouta* rites which do require the assistance of the wife. Since the *śruti* declares that all *karma* at which the wife assists bears fruit, we conclude that *nityakarmas*, as a class, satisfy some desire.

2. Of the five gross elements constituting the universe, the last three—earth, water and light—are regarded as *mūrta* and the other two—ether and air—as *amūrta*. By

of *avidyā*, takes for granted that the self is associated with actions, their accessories and results. Really however, the self is other than this, being unconnected with name, form or action, non-dual, eternal, pure, sentient and free. It only *appears* otherwise—as related to actions, their accessories and results. The following Brahma-knowledge is intended for securing freedom from *avidyā*—the source of activity arising from the disease of desire—to such as reflect that this is all its worth¹ and turn away from the diversity of actions, their aids and fruits,—this concatenation of ends and means.

(The two *Brāhmaṇas*) beginning with 'The dawn is the head of the sacrificial horse' (describe the manner of) meditating upon the horse-sacrifice. The meditation upon the horse is first described because the horse is the most important (aid in this sacrifice) as indeed, is implied by the title—*aśvamédha*. The horse is, besides, sacred to *Prajāpati* (the chief of the gods)³—

vāsana is here meant the *tanmatras* which are the elements by themselves and not in combination with others. See note 2 in *Kāthakōpanishad* p. 72.

1. *Ētāvadityanarthatmatvōktiḥ*. (A.)

2. I. e. in the first *Brāhmaṇa*. The second *Brāhmaṇa* describes the mode of meditating upon *Agni*.

3. As a goat, for example, is sacred to *Agni*.

1. The dawn is the head of the sacrificial horse; the sun, (its) eye; the air, (its) breath; *Agni Vaisvânara* (its) open mouth; the year, the body of the sacrificial horse. The firmament (is its) back; the interspace (between heaven and earth its) belly; the earth (its) hoof; the quarters (its) two sides; the intermediate quarters, (its) ribs; the seasons, (its) limbs; the months and half-months, (its) joints; days and nights, (its) feet; the stars, (its) bones; the heavenly (clouds), (its) flesh. The half-digested food (is) the sand; the rivers, (its) veins; the *yakrit* and *kloman* are the mountains; the herbs and trees, (its) hairs; the mounting (sun, its) forepart; the sinking, (its) hind part. When

it yawns, that is lightning; when it shakes, it thunders; when it urinates, it rains; its neighing is speech.

Ushâh-i.e., a period of time known as the *brâhma-muhûrta*¹. The particle *vai* calls to mind what is familiar—here, a particular division of the day. *Siras*=(head). The dawn is (figured as) the head because of its importance. The head is the most important of all bodily parts (as the dawn is the most important, among the divisions of the day,) The purport is: The head of the sacrificial horse is to be regarded as the dawn. Since the sacrificial horse is to be ceremonially purified, the head and other organs are represented as time and the like (but not *vice versa*)². Moreover, if a thing is figured as *Virâj* it may be looked upon as that deity. To imagine the (limbs of the) animal as time, worlds and deities is to make it one with *Virâj*, for the latter is of that description. It is, for instance, like regarding an idol as *Vishnu* or some other deity. The sun (*sûryah*) is its eye (*chakshuh*) as it comes next after the head³ and

1. I. e. about 48 min: in duration just preceding sunrise.

2. Compare *Vârtikasâra*—*Utkrshatârshthirhne sydt iti sâtrakrâdabravit* (i, 19). vide *Vedanta Sûtras* iv, i, 6.

3. As the sun comes after the dawn.

is presided over by the sun¹. Its breath (*prāṇah*) is air (*vāyuh*) for it consists of air. The open mouth (*vyāttam*) is *Agni Vaiṣvānara*, *Vaiṣvānara* being an epithet qualifying *Agni*². *Agni*, named *Vaiṣvānara*, is the open mouth, for the deity presiding over the mouth is *Agni*. The year consisting of twelve or thirteen³ months is its body, for the year is the body of the various divisions of time. The word *ātman* here means 'body' as is clear from passages like 'The centre of these limbs is the *ātman* (i.e., the body)' *Ai: Âr: ii, iii, 5*. The words *aśvasya mēdhyasya* are repeated in order to show that they should be understood in all the (intervening) clauses. The firmament (*dyaus*) is its back (*prsthāṁ*), both being on high. The interspace between earth and heaven (*antarikṣham*) is the belly (*udaram*), both being hollow. The earth (*prthivī*) is the hoof. *Pājasya* here stands for *padasya* i.e., the part on which the leg rests. The four quarters (*diśah*) are the two sides (*pārśvā*)

1. For this as well as for some of the following statements, see *Aitareyōpanishad* ii.

2. It is thus differentiated from *Agni* or fire that may be impure such as, for example, that which burns a corpse. What is implied here is that *Agni*, pure, is the open mouth of the sacrificial horse. Vide *Vārtikasārāṅgikā*.

3. I.e. including the intercalary month, if there be one.

since the sides come into relation with the quarters. It should not be supposed that this (comparison) is not appropriate as the two (viz. the four directions and the two sides) differ in number, for the horse may turn towards any direction and thus bring its sides into relation with any of the quarters. The intermediate quarters (*avāntara-diśah*) such as the south-east presided over by *Agni* are the ribs (*parṣavah*). The seasons (*ṛtavah*) are bodily parts¹ (*angāni*), they being divisions of time and therefore resembling them. The months (*māsah*) and half-months (*ardhamā-sāh*) are its joints (*sandhayah*) because both mark points of union (one in the year and the other, in the body.) The days and nights (*ahorātrāni*) are its feet (*pratiśthāh*.) The plural, *ahorātrāni*, implies that four kinds of days and nights are meant here, viz., those of *Brahman*, of the gods, of the manes, and of men². They are called *pratiśthāh* or supports because time rests on them as the horse does on its feet. The stars (*nakshatrāni*) are its bones (*asthīni*) both being white. The word *nabhas* here means (not the heavens) but the clouds which are there, for the interspace

1. I.e. other than those already mentioned. *Angāni anukṭāvayavāh*—*Vārtikasāratīkā*.

2. Compare *Amarasimha*.—

Māsena syādahorātrāṇaṃ paitrāṇaṃ ; varshēna daivataṇaṃ.

Daivē yugasahasrē dvē brāhmaṇaṃ. (I, iv.)

between the sky and the earth has already been figured as the belly. These (clouds) are its flesh (*māmsam*), for (a fluid) oozes out from both—water from the one and blood from the other. The half-digested food in the stomach is *avadhya*. It is sand (*sikatāḥ*) because both consist of loose parts. The rivers (*sindhavaḥ*) are (the blood in) the veins, for both flow. The word *gudāḥ* must here denote 'veins' because it is in the plural. *Yakrit* and *klōman* are lumps of flesh to the right and left below the heart. The word *klōmānaḥ* is always used in the plural although it denotes only a single object. These two are mountains (*parvatāḥ*), being hard and raised. *Oshadhayaḥ*—the small plants or herbs; *vanaspatayaḥ*—the big trees. These are respectively the hair (on the body and on the neck or in the tail.) The rising (*udyan*) sun up to midday is the forepart (*pūrvārdham*) of the horse—what is in front of the navel; the sinking (*nimlōchan*) sun from midday onwards is its hind half (*jaghanārdham*). These are so represented for they are in the front and in the rear. Its yawning (*yat vijṛmbhate*)—bending or stretching its limbs—that, is its lightning (*vidyōtate*); both being causes of dividing—the one of the mouth and the other of the cloud. Its shaking of the limbs (*yat vidhānate*) is its thundering (*tat stanayati*) because the roaring in both is similar. Its making water (*mēhati*) is raining:

(*varshati*), for both moisten. Speech (*vāk*) is the neighing (*vāk*) of this horse. No assumption is here necessary¹.

2. The day indeed arose as the first vessel known as *mahiman*, indicating the horse (as being one with *Virāj*); its resting place is the eastern sea. The night indeed arose as the last vessel known as *mahiman* indicating the same (as being one with *Virāj*); its resting place is the western sea. Verily these two vessels sprang on each side of the horse. As *haya* it carried the gods; as *vājī*, the *gandharvas*; as *arvan*, the demons; and as *asvah*, men. The sea is its tying place; the sea is its source.

1. In the above statements such as 'The dawn is the head', the identity is fancied; for the two are quite distinct. But here, in meditating upon neighing as speech, there is no such assumption, for both are sounds.

Two vessels—one golden and the other of silver, each termed *mahiman*—are placed (on the altar), one before the horse (is sacrificed) and the other, after¹. The following meditation refers to them². The day (*ahah*) indeed (*var*) is the golden vessel for both are bright.

(*Question*) How do you explain the simultaneous use of *purastāt* (which means 'in front') and *anu* (which means 'after') in the first sentence?

(*Answer*) The horse has been identified with *Virāj* and as the day directs our attention to *Virāj* who is of the form of the sun and the like, the golden vessel, when it appears on the scene, proclaims that the horse is *Virāj*³. The preposition *anu* here is used (not in the sense of 'after' but as a *karmapravachantiya*) in the same sense in which it is used in the familiar example—'*Vṛksham anu vidyótate vidyut*—The lightning

1. *Agrataḥ pṛshṭhatascheti samjnapanāt prágūrdhvam chēti yāvat.* (A)

2. This should not be regarded as a separate meditation. It is subsidiary to the meditation upon the horse explained in the above passage and is intended to glorify the horse.

3. But for the presence of these vessels and other signs, the sacrificial horse would not be recognised as such.

flashes forth pointing out the tree.' Of this vessel the eastern sea is the resting place. The locative case used for the nominative in *pārve smudré* is due to Vedic license. *Yōni* here means 'place of rest.' Similarly the night is the silver vessel, for both possess the same lustre¹ or because of their inferiority (the night and silver being respectively inferior to the day and gold). It arose afterwards, proclaiming the horse (as being one with *Virāj*). Of it the western sea is the resting place. The vessels are called *mahiman* because of their *excellence*. That a golden and a silver vessel should be placed as above contributes to the glory of the horse. 'These two vessels, as described above, appeared, one on each side of the horse.' This repetition is for glorifying the horse. The succeeding statements also are intended to praise the horse. *Haya*, if derived from *hi* 'to go', means 'the speedy.' Or the word may denote a particular variety of horse². *dēvdn avahat*=enabled the gods to attain godhead because it is one with *Virāj*³. Or the phrase may (merely) mean 'carried the gods.'

(Question.) Is it not disparaging to the horse to explain the words thus—as 'carrying the gods'?

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1. A moonlit night is to be thought of here. (A)
 2. As *vāj* and the other terms used here do.
 3. *Virāj* can grant this privilege.

(Answer.) No; for carrying others is natural to a horse; it being so, if a horse carries the gods and such other beings, it certainly redounds to the credit of the animal.

Similarly *vāji* and other terms denote varieties of horses. The meaning of these clauses after supplying the ellipsis is—‘as *vāji*, it carried the *gandharvas*’; ‘as *arvan*, it carried the demons’; and ‘as *aśva*, it carried men’. By *samudra*¹ is here meant the supreme Lord. He is its *bandhu* i.e., *bandhanam* or tying place. The supreme Lord is also the source of its birth². By declaring that it is born from a pure source and remains in a pure place³, the scripture extols the horse. Or the word *samudra* may be taken to mean the ocean itself here, for according to *Tait : Br : III, viii, 4* the horse has sprung from the waters.

1. *Samutpadya bhūtāni dravantyasminniti vyutpattyā paramagambhīrasyeśvarasya samudraśabdatāmāha paramātmēti. (A)*

2. As being the source of all. Compare *Vārtika i, 9*.

3. *Samudrē badavā yadvat utpadyāritya vartate. Parātmani virāḍaśvaḥ tathāivēti vichintayēt. Vartikasāra i, 21.*

SECOND BRÂHMAṆA.

Now is related how *Agni*¹ that is employed at a horse-sacrifice was born. (The legend regarding) its birth which shows how great this *Agni* is, is narrated only as a preliminary to the meditation.

1. Naught was here in the beginning ; by Death was it concealed—by hunger, for hunger is Death. He created that mind saying 'Let me become reflective'. He went about worshipping. From him (thus) worshipping was born water. (He thought)- 'While I worshipped (*arch*), water (*ka*) sprang forth'—that is why *arka* (*Agni*) is called *arka*.

1. *Agni*. the object of meditation here, is not fire, but the altar on which the fire is placed, this altar also being known as *Agni* (*parthivâgni*, *chityâgni*). Thus the legend here related refers to the birth of *Agni* in this sense and not of fire whose birth from *Vāyu* is well-known.

Happiness indeed is his who knows why *arka* is so called.

Iha i.e., in the whole universe. *kim cha na*= anything differentiated by name and form. *na éva dstit*=did not at all exist. *agre* i.e., before the birth of mind and the like.

Question: Was there (then) absolutely nothing?

*Answer*¹: It must be so, for the *śruti* says 'Naught was there'. Neither cause² nor effect existed (then)³. (Moreover so far as the effect is concerned it could not at all have existed then) for it is *produced*. We know, for example, that a pot, which is produced, does not exist before its production.

Question: How can the cause be non-existent (then)? We see, for instance, the lump of clay (before the pot is made). The effect may not

1. This is the nihilist's answer who fancies that the Veda gives a support to his view.

2. By the term 'cause' in the following discussion must be understood the 'material cause'—the clay, for example, in the case of a pot and not the potter or the staff.

3. This is the view of the nihilist who maintains that neither cause nor effect exists in the beginning and that everything springs into being from nothing.

exist then because we do not perceive it¹; but not so the cause (which we do perceive)².

*Answer*³: Not so; for (according to the above text) nothing is perceived before creation. If non-perception be a proof of non-existence, then, speaking of the universe as a whole, neither the cause nor the effect is perceived before creation and we must therefore conclude that neither of them existed then.

*Answer*⁴: That is not right; for the text says—'By Death was this concealed'. If there were nothing—neither what conceals, nor what is concealed,—the scripture would not say 'By Death was this concealed'.⁵ It is not for instance proper to say that a barren woman's son is covered over with flowers sprung from the sky. The scripture (expressly) states that all this was (then) covered by Death. Hence we conclude—because of the

1. Remove the stop after *ndastitā*.

2. This represents the view of the *Naiyyāyika* who holds that the cause must exist before the effect is produced but not the effect also.

3. This is also the nihilist's answer and not of the *siddhāntin*.

4. Here begins the answer of the *siddhāntin*.

5. This scriptural statement only denies the absence of *differentiated* entities before creation. It does not mean that there was nothing at all then.

validity of scriptural testimony—that, what conceals viz, the cause and what is concealed viz; the effect, did both exist before creation.

That both the cause and the effect must exist before creation can also be established by reasoning. For (in experience) an effect, which is positive in character, can be produced only when the cause exists and not when it does not. On this analogy of the pre-existence of a cause in the case of a pot, we infer that the cause of the universe also must have existed before creation.¹

Objection: Even in the case of a pot, the cause does not pre-exist, for the pot comes into being only *after* destroying what you say to be the cause viz, the lump of clay.²

Answer: Your objection is not valid for (we do not admit that the *lump* of clay is the

1. The position of the nihilist is controverted in two stages. It is first shown that the cause must necessarily exist before the effect is produced; and then that the effect also must be admitted to exist always.

2. The material cause is that which is found to continue in the effect and which exists *immediately* before the effect is produced. The latter condition is not satisfied by the lump of clay, because it is destroyed before the pot comes into being. Hence it is said that it is not the cause.

cause) but only the *material*—clay. The cause of a pot or a necklace is clay or gold and not any particular shape or form of them. For even in the absence of any such specific forms, the effect is produced, the mere material (irrespective of its shape) being sufficient for the purpose. Hence specific forms of clay or gold are not the cause of the pot or the necklace. Again when the material is not present, the pot or the necklace is not produced, showing that the substance—gold or clay—is the cause and not particular states of it. Every cause when it produces an effect does so only after rendering latent a certain other effect which was till then manifest, for one cause cannot at one and the same time appear as more than one effect. When the former of two effects disappears, the *substance* of the cause does not suffer destruction. Hence it is not right to say that because a specific condition of the cause disappears before we have a particular effect, that effect springs from nothing.

Objection: Your contention that when an effect disappears, its¹ cause does not do so but endures in the form of another effect is not right inasmuch as clay or any such material is never

1. Compare *Vārtikasāra*—

Asādhāraṇarūpēṣhu vyāvṛttīśhvitarētaram

Bahushvēkam yadābhāti pratyakṣam kāraṇam tu tat.
ii, 49.

found dissociated from all forms.

Answer: No; for clay, the material in our example, is seen to persist when the pot comes to be and the lump ceases to be.

Objection: Your belief in the sameness of the material here is (an illusion) due to similarity (and not to identity.)

Answer: No; for we *actually* perceive in the pot the very elements that once constituted the lump. To argue in the face of such (conclusive) evidence, that the belief is due to similarity or something like it would be to argue wrongly¹. That inference should yield precedence to perception is but right because inference is dependent upon perception². (If your theory be admitted)

1. A certain section of the Buddhists believe that all things are momentary and that the notion they are continuous entities is an illusion. A lamp-flame, for instance, is in no two moments *materially* the same; yet we speak of it as being one and continuous. The fallacy here is pointed out in the *Tika* as being similar to the fallacy in the following—Because water is cool to the touch all things including fire must be cool to the touch. When inference contradicts correct perception, it is the former that must be wrong.

2. Correct inference is possible only when the premises on which it is based are vouched by perception. This is why inference is stated to be dependent upon perception.

nothing would be worthy of trust¹. If everything be momentary—even what is recognised as previously perceived—the notion (of momentariness) would need another (supporting notion); that, another; and so forth *ad infinitum*. Thus the notion of similarity (by which you explain recognition) would not itself be proper evidence (until confirmed by another notion) and there would be certainty nowhere. Moreover if a *continuous* knower is not admitted, there will be no connecting link between two notions (both of which are momentary²). It cannot be that similarity will furnish the needed link, for two notions relating to an object perceived at different times cannot cognise each other and when

1. The Buddhists who maintain that all things are momentary also maintain that no notion can, by itself, be taken as true until it is corroborated by other notions. Recognition being a notion cannot, although it be based upon perception, be admitted as conclusive until it is confirmed by other notions. Thus the *advaitin's* view that the recognition of clay as being the same in the lump and the pot is sufficient to refute the view that it is due to similarity, appears unsound to a Buddhist. His objection is met by the statement that agreeing to the theory that all notions require confirmation from outside would lead to the cessation of all life's activities. If everything needed confirmation there would be faith nowhere.

2. Here the matter is considered from the standpoint of the subject and not that of the object, the Buddhists believing that the ego also is momentary.

that cannot take place, there will be no perception of similarity.

Objection: There may be the notion of similarity when there is no similarity.

Answer: Then the same will have to be said of the notions (regarded as referring to similar objects) and they would in consequence refer to non-entities.

Objection: Let all notions refer to non-entities. (Where is the harm ?)¹

Answer: In that case the notion of notions would itself refer to what is non-existent.

Objection: I admit that also.

Answer: Then the notion of non-existence would be false because all notions are so.

It is therefore wrong to say that we seem to perceive identity when we perceive only similarity. To sum up—The cause must exist before the effect is produced.

The effect also must be existent before its manifestation.

1. Here the ground has shifted to nihilism. The nihilist in denying objects is forced to deny notions also, which of course he cannot.

Question: Why?

Answer: Because it is implied by the very fact that it becomes *manifest* (afterwards.)¹ 'Manifestation' means becoming an object of direct perception. Whatever, in our experience, say a pot, is enveloped in darkness, becomes an object of direct perception when the darkness is dispelled by light. This shows that the pot necessarily exists before. Similarly, we conclude it should be in the case of the universe. If there were no pot at all, for instance, it would not be perceived even when the sun rose.

Opponent: You cannot press that argument since, as you do not deny the existence, at any time, of the effect, it will necessarily have to be perceived always. The pot being taken by you to be always existent, you must see it whenever the sun shines, provided only there is² the

1. This looks like begging the question. But it is only a preliminary consideration and various proofs will be adduced later on. That what is manifested exists before manifestation is shown here as probable by means of familiar illustrations; it is not proved.

2. Here is a textual difficulty of a somewhat perplexing character. The printed editions of the *Bhāṣya* generally read *mṛtpindāśannihitē* and are supported in this by the *Tīkā* which states that the second word here is *asannihite* and not *sannihite*. But this reading does

lump of clay¹ within sight and nothing like darkness envelops it.

Answer: Not so; because concealment is of two kinds. An effect like a pot may be unperceived for two reasons. If it has manifested itself from clay, it may be concealed in darkness, by an enclosure or some such thing; if it has not so manifested itself it is rendered latent by one or other of the several other effects of its material cause e. g. by the lump. Hence an effect is not perceived before manifestation, although it is existent—for it is hidden or latent. The terms (in ordinary use) such as 'lost', 'born'; 'existent', 'non-existent' and the ideas denoted by them are based on this two-fold character of manifestation and concealment.

Objection: But there is a distinction between the concealing of a thing by an enclosure, for example, and by specific forms of the cause such as a lump of clay. Darkness or an enclosure like a wall occupies space other than that occupied by the pot while the lump of clay and

not appear to yield the right sense and the translation accordingly follows the *Sri Vani Vilās* edition which has *mṛtpinde sannihite*.

1. *Mṛtpiṇḍagrahaṇam* *viródhikāvyópalakṣhaṇār-*
tham. (A)

the potsherd¹ do not do so. Hence it is not right to say that although the pot exists, it is not perceived because it is hidden by the lump or the potsherd, for neither of them can be said to conceal the pot (as a wall, for example, does.)

Answer: That is not so, for water (mixed with) milk is seen to occupy the same space², as what conceals it, viz., milk.

Objection: Since the elements of the lump or the potsherd themselves constitute the pot, they cannot conceal the pot³.

Answer: No; these elements are separate because they (produce) distinct effects (of the material cause) and may therefore well conceal the pot⁴.

1. The lump of clay is intended to stand for all effects that are anterior to the manifestation of the pot: the potsherd, of all those that are posterior.

2. The *Vārtikasāra* suggests another illustration—
Ekasminneva viyati chāndram tejōbhībhāyate.

Saurēṇa tejasā tadvat pindēndriyatām ghataḥ. ii 59.

3. What is meant is that although milk and water occupy the same space, their particles are distinct and stand apart, while in the case of a pot and the lump of clay they are identical.

4. The *advaitin* holds that the elements constituting different effects are themselves distinct although derived from the same material; otherwise the effects would themselves be identical, other conditions remaining the same.

B. 3

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Objection: (In that case a person that desires an effect) must endeavour only to remove the veil that conceals it. If the pot exists already in the lump of clay or the potsherd and is not perceived because of its being concealed therein, a person that desires to have a pot must merely try to destroy the concealing factor and not set about producing the pot directly. Such however is not the case. Hence it is incorrect to assert that the effect exists but is not perceived owing to its concealment.

Answer: Not so, for there is no uniform rule regarding this (even in cases where the pre-existence of concealed objects is not questioned by you). For instance the perception of a pot does not always result when an attempt is made only to remove the veil hiding it. We find people lighting a lamp to find a pot enveloped in darkness.

Objection: Well, that attempt is for removing darkness and when it is removed, the pot becomes, of itself, perceivable. It adds nothing to the pot.

Answer: It is not so; for the pot is perceived (then) as being *bright*. When the lamp is lighted the pot is seen to become bright; but it was not so before. Hence the lighting of the lamp is not

merely for dispelling darkness but also for illumining the pot, for the pot is perceived illumined¹. Sometimes, however, there may be an endeavour only to remove the hiding veil as for instance when a wall is demolished (and the object beyond it becomes visible). Thus we conclude that there is no uniform rule that a person who desires for the manifestation (of an existing but hidden object) must strive only to remove the veil that hides it.

Rather a direct effort (over and above that for removing the concealing factor) is always necessary, if a *latent* object is to become manifest.² We have already stated that a cause when transformed as a particular effect conceals all its other effects. If we endeavour only to

1. What is contended here is that it is wrong to say that an effort to remove the concealing element is *alone* sufficient for the manifestation of a hidden object. Ordinarily such efforts while removing the veil, add something to the object and thus also aid its manifestation. In the illustration given above the pot is united with light and is perceived as such.

2. In the case of an object which is latent and not merely concealed, a direct attempt at aiding manifestation is a necessity; in the case of objects already manifest but lying concealed, such an endeavour may or may not be necessary. This is the substance of the foregoing and the present arguments.

destroy the already manifest effect viz, the lump of clay (existing before the pot) or the pot-sections (seen after the pot is broken) we get only particles (of earth) and small fragments. Being themselves effects, these will necessarily conceal the pot and we shall not therefore see it. This means a further effort is needed (and then a further effort and so on). Hence one that desires for the manifestation of a (latent) effect like a pot must necessarily strive *directly* to produce it.¹ Thus we conclude that the effect certainly exists before it becomes manifest.

Moreover there is admitted by all, a distinction between a notion which relates to a past object and that which relates to a future object.² As in the case of the notion of a pot existing now, the notion of a past or of a future pot also must refer to an existing pot. Again we find that objects not yet manifest are sought (by people). If a thing does not exist at all, none will seek it. Besides (we must admit) as true the knowledge of *yôgins* relating to objects which belong to the

1. The direct effort alluded to here is the *kulālavya-pāra* i.e. the operation of a potter required for producing a pot.

2. I.e. if the pot exists only in the present, there must be only *one* kind of notion relating to the pot: and not *three*, as is now the case.

past or the future. If the future pot¹ does not exist at all, God's *perception* of it now will be false. Nor can you regard that the word 'perception' here is used in a secondary sense, (for) we have already shown by reasoning why the pot should be taken to exist always.²

Further (to assume that the pot does not always exist) would lead to a self-contradiction. When a potter employs himself in producing a pot, if it be rightly determined that the pot will be produced, it will be a contradiction to say that the pot will not exist just at a time when, according to that determination, it comes to be. To say that a future pot is not, is equivalent

1. *I.e.* a pot which is to manifest itself hereafter. We must also understand here the past pot *i.e.* a pot which was manifest once but is no longer so.

2. The opponent's view set forth here is as follows: Perception is no doubt only of objects existing during the time of perception. Yet in the case of God's perception, let us understand this word in a secondary and not a literal sense, so that it may not imply that the object *exists* whenever God perceives it. Let God's perception be correct as knowledge; only let it not be regarded as perception in its full sense. This objection is met in the following manner: A word should be understood in a secondary sense *only* when the primary sense is altogether inadmissible. In the present case the primary sense is admissible, for our previous argument has shown that the pot exists always.

to saying that the pot will not come to be. This is as much a contradiction as saying 'This pot does not exist.' If, however, what you mean by the non-existence of a pot before its manifestation is only that it does not exist in a form which is *serviceable* (to us, say, for fetching water)¹, then there is no divergence of view (between us two)². For we only say that the future pot now exists in a subtle form. Relation with the present time which belongs to the lump of clay or the sections of the pot, cannot belong to the pot, just as the futurity belonging to the pot does not belong to the lump of clay or the fragments of the pot. Hence it is not wrong to deny that during the employment of the potter and before its manifestation, the pot exists (in this sense). If you denied the reality of the future pot—its *svarūpam*—that would be wrong, but you do not deny that³. Relationship with

1. The clause, whose substance is here stated means literally that 'it does not exist in the manner in which, for instance, the potter exists—active and making a pot.'

2. The Vedantin means that before manifestation an object is not absolute nothing. He does not mean that it then exists *exactly* as it does after it becomes manifest. (A.)

3. Two phases of the question are considered here. Is it the *svarūpam* of the pot that is denied? Or is it merely meant that an object, which has not manifested

the present or the future cannot of course be the same for (all phases of) a changing thing.

Further, of the four kinds of non-existence, the *itarêtarābhāva* or mutual exclusion say, of a pot, is other than the pot. The *itarêtarābhāva* of a pot is, for example, a (piece of) cloth or some other thing, but not the pot itself. Moreover (we cannot say that) the piece of cloth is non-existent (merely) because it is (represented as) (the) *non-existence* (of a pot).

Question: What then?

Answer: It must be positive in character.² Similarly the other kinds of non-existence must be different from the pot because, like mutual non-existence, they also have reference to a pot. And in the same manner, these other kinds of non-existence must also be positive in character.

itself yet, is not serviceable to us now? The former view has already been refuted. He who holds the latter view is correct according to the *Vedāntin*.

1. Four kinds of non-existence are distinguished:—
(1) *Prāgabhāva* or the non-existence of a thing before it comes into being, (2) *Pradhvamasābhāva* or the non-existence of a thing after it ceases to be, (3) *Itarêtarābhāva* mutual exclusion or the non-existence of one thing in another and (4) *atyantābhāva* or the absolute non-existence of a thing.

2. *Svarūpapararūpābhyām sarvaṃ sadasadātmakam.*

Hence the non-appearance of a pot previous to its manifestation, merely because it is termed an *abhāva*, cannot lead us to the conclusion that the pot does not exist at all.

(*Objection* : You thus deny *abhāva* altogether although it is as well-known as *bhāva*.)

Answer : If it is to be recognised, what should be its character?—the same as the pot taking the above illustration or different from it ?) If, for example, the previous non-existence of a pot were identical with the pot, it would be improper to state it as belonging to a pot.¹

Objection : Let this relationship be regarded as conventional, as in the example 'a torso's trunk'.

Answer : In that case what belongs to the pot is the conventionally assumed non-existence and not the pot itself. As regards the alternative that the non-existence of a pot is different from the pot, we have already stated our view.

Again if the pot did not at all exist, before its manifestation, say like a hare's horn, it could not come into relation with its cause or with existence

1. As '*ghatasya abhāvaḥ*' or 'non-existence of a pot.'

in general¹, for all relation is between two (existing) things.

Objection: This is not the rule in regard to logically inseparable objects.

Answer: No, for there can be no such inseparability between existence and non-existence. Existing things may be logically separable or inseparable, but not an existing and a non-existing one or two non-existing things. Thus we conclude that the effect exists before its manifestation.

Now is stated by what kind of Death all was concealed. *Aśandāyā*=desire to eat or hunger. That is the character of Death. *Aśandāyayā*—by Death of this description. Why is hunger called Death? This is answered in the next sentence where the particle *hi* implies that the reason is well-known. Whoever desires to eat, kills beings only after feeling hungry. Thus hunger suggests Death and therefore the text says, 'Hunger indeed is Death.' Hunger is the characteristic of a sentient being and so the word *mṛtyu* (here) denotes *Hiranyagarbha* whose (chief) limiting adjunct is the mind². This effect (viz. the universe) was

1. *Svabhūtasambandhassattāsambandho vā janmēti tārkikāḥ* (A.)

2. All the subtle bodies of beings, in their totality, form the adjunct of *Hiranyagarbha*. He is described here as *buddhyavasthaḥ*, the mind being the most important constituent of the subtle body. Comp. Page 11. Note 2.

concealed in that *Hiranyagarbha*, as a pot, for example, is concealed in clay (found) in the form of a lump. *tat* refers to *manas*. *Hiranyagarbha*, with a view to produce the effect, presently to be mentioned, created (*akuruta*) the mind (*manaḥ*), the internal organ, characterised by desire and so forth and (*tat*) capable of reflecting about what has to be done. With what object did he create the mind? The reply is *ātmanvī syām iti* i.e., that he may become reflective through the mind. *ātmanvī*=*ātmavān* i.e., possessing mind (*ātman*) *Saḥ* i.e., *Hiranyagarbha*, with the mind thus manifested. *archan*=*archayan* i.e., worshipping himself¹ as having achieved his object. *acharat*=went about². *tasya*=of that *Hiranyagarbha*. *archataḥ*=who was worshipping. *āpaḥ ajāyanta* i.e., water accessory to worship, was born. Here we should supply 'after the birth of the three elements beginning with ether,' on the strength of other sacred texts³. There can, moreover, be no two

1. 'Worshipping' here means only 'feeling gratified'.

2. *Hiranyagarbha* has no gross body and all his activity is, in consequence, of the nature of reflection, which, in his case, is adequate to bring about the desired result. Hence 'went about' means 'reflected' or 'thought.'

3. The reason why the creation of these three elements is left out is that this passage is not primarily intended to describe the order of creation. The allusion to the subject is only incidental and is intended to show the high origin of *agni*, the object of the meditation.

different orders of creation. *archatē me*—of me, while I worshipped. *kam*=water. *abhāt*=sprang. So thought *Hiranyagarbha* and therefore the *agni* used at a horse-sacrifice is known as *arka*¹. This explains the derivation of the word *arka* when it means *agni*². *Agni* has the descriptive title of *arka* because it is connected with a happy sense of gratification (*arch*) and with water (*ka*)³. Whoever knows the aforesaid reason for *arka* being so called (*ya évam arkasyárkatvam vèda*), to him (*asmai*) comes (*bhavati*) water or happiness—both having the same name (*kam*). *ha* and *vai* are particles denoting affirmation. The meaning is—‘Whoever knows this, will certainly reap this fruit.’

2. Water verily is *arka* ; what was there as the froth of water,

1. Strictly speaking this may account for *Hiranyagarbha*, and not *agni*, being known as *arka*. But as will presently be shown *agni* is born of *Hiranyagarbha* and is therefore called *arka* forgetting, for the time being, the distinction between the cause and its effect. Compare *Tikā*—*Evam mṛtyōrarkatvepi kathamagnérarkatvam ityḍṣankya mṛtyusambandhādityāha agnērīti*.

2. This out-of-the-way designation for *agni* implies that *agni* should be meditated upon in a particular manner. Compare *Tikā*—*Apūrvasamjñayōgasya phalāntarābhāvāt upāsanārthamityāha agnērīti*.

3. *Arka* means the Sun primarily and *agni*, only secondarily.

that hardened ; that became the earth and thereupon (*Hiranyagarbha*) became exhausted. Out of him, exhausted and afflicted, sprang forth the essence of splendour—*agni*.

What is this *arka*?¹ *Arkā* is water, accessory to worship (*āpo vai arkah*), because it is the source of *agni*. Besides fire is said to reside in water. Hence it is known as *arka* (only secondarily but) not directly. The context is not of water, but of *agni*. Compare what is stated later on (I, ii, 7) — 'This *agni* is *arka*' *Tat=tatra*=on that. *Yat apdm saraḥ āsīt*= what was there as froth on water or as cream on curds. *tat*=that. *samahan-yata*=became solidified, being heated by splendour, inside and outside. The use of the neuters—*yat* and *tat*—in reference to *saraḥ* which is of the masculine gender is peculiar². They should be taken as equivalent to *yaḥ* and *saḥ*. *Sā prthivī abhavat* i.e. that hardened substance became this earth. What is meant is that the cosmic egg sprang:

1. The text appears to mean that *arka* is water directly. Hence the explanation that it means water because it means *agni* and *agni* is produced from water. See note 1. p. 43.

2. *Uktānupapattidyōtanārtho vāśabdaḥ*. (A)

from the water. *tasyām i.e.*, when the earth had been produced. *aśrāmyat i.e.*, *Hiranyagarbha* felt exhausted. All people, when they work, become exhausted and the work of the creator was vast, being the creation of the earth. What of him (thus) exhausted? *tasya*=out of him. *śrāntasya*=exhausted. *taptasya*=distressed¹ *tejōrasaḥ*=the essence of splendour.² *niravartata*—proceeded *i.e.*, from his body. Who was it that so proceeded? *agniḥ i.e.*, the *Virāj*, who is the first-born and is the aggregate of body and senses, born inside the egg. Compare the *Smṛti* 'He is the first embodied &c.' *Vide. Kath. Up. note 1. p. 18.*

3. He divided himself in three ways—with the sun as the third; with the wind as the third. The self-same *Prāna* became three-fold. Of him the eastern quarter is the head; and that and that, arms; and of him, the western quarter is

1. Exhaustion and distress are not to be understood in a physical sense. They are due to thought. Compare note 2. p. 42. Read *Khinnasya*.

2. The *tējas* is nothing but *chaitanya* or sentiency which was transmitted to the new being—*Virāj*.

the hind part; that and that, the hip-bones. South and North are its sides, the firmament, the back; the interspace between (heaven and earth) the belly; and this, the breast. He stands firm in water. And wherever a person that meditates thus, goes, there will he stand firm.

Sah=the *Virāj* who had sprung into being. *trédhā*=in three ways, *ātmanam*=himself i.e., the aggregate of (subtle) causes and (gross) effects¹. *vyakuruta*=divided. How, in three ways? *ādityam tṛtīyam*—the Sun making three with the Fire and Wind. We must here supply *vyakuruta* i.e., divided. Similarly *vāyum tṛtīyam* means 'the Wind making three with Fire and Sun'. We should also understand (although not expressly stated) 'the Fire as third with the Sun and Wind'—it being equally possible to have thus a total of three. *Sa esha prāṇaḥ*=the same *Prāṇa* i.e., *Virāj*, although the self of all beings. *trédhā* in three ways as Fire, Sun and Air, specifically. *vihitaḥ*=differentiated himself without losing his original character

1. *Hiranyagarbha* can be described only as *karana saṅghāta*.

of *Virāj*¹. Now follows, as in the case of the horse, (a description of) the meditation upon this *arka*—the first-born *Virāj*—which is identified with the altar used at a horse-sacrifice. We have already stated that the origin of this *agni*, as described above, is for extolling it by showing that it is so pure in its source. *tasya*=of it. *prāchi dik*=the eastern quarter; *śiraḥ*=head—both being the best. *asauchāsau cha*—the North-East and South-East (pointing to them). *irmau*=arms—the word being derived from the root *ir* 'to go'. *atha i.e.*, (and). *asya*=of this fire. *prāchi dik*=the western quarter. *puchcham*=the tail *i.e.*, the hind part, for when it faces east (the hind part) turns towards the west. *asauchāsau cha i.e.*, the North-West and South-West (pointing to them). *sakthyan*=*sakthini*=hip-bones²—forming angles on the back. *dakṣiṇā chōdīchi cha*=the southern and northern quarters. *pārṣvā*=the two sides—both coming in contact with the (other) two quarters. *dyauḥ prsthāntarikshamudaram*—to be understood as in i, 1. *iyam i.e.*, (this earth); *urāḥ*=breast—both being beneath. *Sa eshaḥ*—this *agni* who is *Virāj* and is of the form of all the worlds. *apsu*=in water. *pratishṭhitah*=is support-

1. *Yathā tantvavasthānupamardanēna mūlakdranāt patō jāyate tathā.* (A)

2. *Sakthipadam prsthāntarikshāntasthivayavishayam* (A).

ed. Compare another sacred text—'Thus these are inside the water'. *Yatra kvacha*=wherever. *éti*=goes. *tadéva*=*tatraiva*=there alone. *pratitishṭhati*=obtains support. Who? *ya évam vidván* i.e., he who meditates thus--that *agni* is supported in water. This is the statement of (only) a subsidiary result¹.

4. He desired—'Let me have a second form' and he—the hunger which is Death—mentally united with the word. What (then) was the seed there, that became the Year. Before then there was no Year at all. He supported it for so long—one year—and after this period, brought it forth. When it was born, he opened his mouth (to swallow it). It cried out *bhàn* and that became speech.

Sah i.e., *Hiranyagarbha* who had created through himself, in the order of water etc., out of the

1. The main fruit of the meditation upon *agni* is declared in passage 7.

cosmic egg, the *Virāj—agni*—who is the aggregate of all causes and effects and who divided himself in three ways. Doing what, did he create (*Virāj*)? *Saḥ*=He, i.e., Death. *akāmayata* desired. What? *dvitīyaḥ*=a second. *mé*=to me. *ātma*=body. *jdyētēti* i.e. might be born, so that I might become embodied. He desired that such (a second body) might spring up. *Saḥ* i.e. he having thus desired. *manasā* i.e. by the mind already born. *vācham*—speech viz., the Veda. *mithunam samabhavat*=united with. It means 'He pondered over the Veda' i.e. He thought of the order of creation as narrated in the Veda. Who was it that did so? *aśanāyā mṛtyuḥ* i.e. *Hiranyagarbha* implied by (the word) 'hunger' as stated already in passage 1. The text refers to him expressly here in order that no other be understood¹. *tat=tatra*=there i.e. in that union. *Yat retah*—what seed—the cause of the first-born *Virāj*. *astī*=was. The seed here meant is 'meditation and karma'² which he recognised through pondering over the Veda and which belonged to him in his previous existence. Influenced by that idea, he (*saḥ*) created water and entering it, through that seed, became an embryo—an egg

1. *Anyatrdnantaraprakṛte virāḍātmanīti yāvat* (A).

2. Meditation and karma are together the means of obtaining the position of the *Virāj*. Hence they are termed here the 'seed'.

B. 4

—and was born (*samabhavat*) as a Year (*samvatsarah*) i.e. the creator of the year (*Virāj*). *Na ha purā tātaḥ samvatsara āsa*—before then i.e. before the birth of the *Virāj*, the creator of the Year, there was no Year at all. *tam* i.e. the creator of the Year i.e. *Virāj*. *etāvantam kālam* i.e. for the well-known period of a year. *abibhaḥ* i.e. Death supported in the womb. What did he do after this period? *etāvataḥ kālasya parastāt*—after this period of a year. *tam*=him. *asṛjata* i.e. sent forth i.e. broke open the egg. *tam jātam*=him born i.e. his child, the first-embodied. *abhivyādādāt*=i.e. opened his mouth for swallowing him, because he was hungry. *saḥ*=the child, being afraid through natural ignorance¹. *bhāṇ akarōt*=cried out *bhāṇ*. *sā eva*=the same. *vāk*—speech. *abhavat*=became.

5. He thought: ‘If I should kill him, I should get but little food’. With that word and by that mind, he brought forth all this, whatever is—the *Rik*, the *Yajus*, the *Sāman*, the metres, the sacrifices, men and animals. Whatever he brought forth he

1. Fear is due to ignorance; for, in reality, there is nothing to fear from, unity being the truth.

resolved to eat. Because he eats all, *aditi* is called *aditi*. He becomes the eater of everything and everything becomes his food—who meditates upon why *aditi* is so called.

Sah i.e., that *Hiranyagarbha*, although hungry, seeing his off-spring, who thus cried out. *aikshata*=thought. *yadi*=if. *vai*=at all. *imam* i.e., this child. *abhimamsye*=kill. *kaniyaḥ annam*=little food. *karishye*=I shall make. Thus thinking, he ceased from (his attempt to) swallow it. 'I must have plenty of food for eating during a long period; not a little. By eating this, there will be only a little food. For instance, if the seed be eaten, there will be no grain (to harvest).' Having thus thought of the advantage of possessing abundant food, he (*sah*) by the self-same mind (*tena ātmanā*) became united with the self-same word (*tayā vāchā*). He reflected repeatedly and brought forth (*asrjata*) all this (*idam sarvam*)—moving as well as stationary. *yadidam kim chā*—all that we perceive. What is that? The *Rik*, the *Yajus*, and the *Sāman*; *chandāmsi*=metres viz. of seven varieties beginning with the *gāyatri* i. e., the threefold *mantras* consisting of *stotra*, *ṣastra*,

and the rest¹—in metres such as the *gāyatri*—employed at sacrifices; *yajñān*=sacrifices which are performed by means of them; *prajāh* i.e., their performers; *paṣūn*=animals—tame and wild²—which are necessary for *karma*. Well, was it not said that he created *Virāj* uniting himself with the Veda? How can you now say that the Veda is *produced*? This presents no difficulty; for his mind united (then) with the unmanifest Veda, while here the allusion is to its manifestation in a form such as can be utilised in sacrifices. *Sah* i.e. *Hiranyagarbha*, having thus thought of increasing the food. *yadyadeva*=whatever—rite, its aid, or fruit. *asṛjata*=(brought forth). *tattat*=(all that). *attum*=to eat, *adhriyata*=resolved. Because he eats (*atti*) everything (*sarvam*), *aditi* or *Hiranyagarbha* is so called. Compare: '*Aditi* is heaven; *aditi* is, the interspace; *aditi* is the mother &c. (*Taitt: Âr: i, 13*) *sarvasya etasya*=of all this universe, serving as food. *attā*=eater; *bhavati*=he becomes. He is (said to become) the eater of all, because

1. This refers to all Vedic formulas used at a sacrifice, which are other than *stōtras* and *śāstras*. Compare *Tikā: Yannagigate na cha śasyate adhvaryuprabhṛtibhiḥcha prayujyate tadapayatṛa grāhyamityabhiprētya ādipadam*.

2. The number of animals offered to the deities at a horse-sacrifice comes to some hundreds and many of them are wild, like the mongoose, elephant etc.

he is of the form of all. Otherwise the statement would be absurd, for there is no one who eats all. Hence it means that one comes to possess the character of all. Everything becomes his food. It is but right that what is *all* should have *all* for its food. (What is meant is that one will be all and will be the experiencing agent in all.) This result accrues to him who meditates on why *aditi* is so called.

6. He desired: 'Let me with the great sacrifice again sacrifice'. He became exhausted, he felt afflicted. Out of him exhausted and afflicted, fame and strength went forth. The senses are fame and strength. When the senses departed, the body began to swell, (but) his mind was in the body.

The next two *mantras* are for explaining the derivation of the words *aśva* and *aśvamêdha*. *Bhūyasd yajñēna*=by a great sacrifice. *bhūyāḥ*=again. *yajēya*=let me sacrifice. *iti*=thus. The word 'again' here is used in reference to what he performed in his previous birth. *Hiranyagarbha* in a previous birth had performed a horse-sacrifice and at the beginning of the *kalpa* or

world-period, he was born under its influence. Having transformed himself into the rite, its aids and result, he desired that he should again perform a great sacrifice. He (*saḥ*) having thought of the great deed, (*aśrāmyat*) became exhausted as other beings do. *sa tapó tapyata*=He felt afflicted. *Tasya śrāntasya taptasya*—these words are to be understood as in passage 2. *yaśaḥ*=fame. *viryam*=strength. *udakrāmat*=(went forth). The text itself explains what this means—*prāṇaḥ* i.e., the senses such as the eye. They are *yaśaḥ* i.e., fame i.e. the source of fame. Similarly the senses are *viryam* i.e., bodily strength. When life departs, man can neither acquire fame nor be strong. Hence the senses are (said to be) fame and strength of body. Such fame and strength went forth from his body. *prāṇeshu utkrānteshu* i.e., when the senses which are fame and strength left the body. *tat śarīram*=the body of the creator. *śvayathum adhriyata*=began to swell. It also became impure or unfit for sacrifice. And of that creator, although he had left the body, the mind lurked in it, as in the case of a person who, although going to a distance, is yet mindful of what is dear to him (at home).

7. He desired ; ‘Let this of mine become fit for sacrifice ;

let me become embodied.' Then he became a horse (*asva*) since he swelled (*asvat*). He became fit for sacrifice (*médhyam*) and that is why the horse-sacrifice is known as *asvamèdha*. He indeed knows what an *asvamedha* is, who meditates thus. Without controlling it, he thought. After a year, he sacrificed it for himself. The (other) animals, he gave to the gods. Therefore (sacrificers now) kill the purified horse—consecrated to all the gods—as belonging to *Prajápati*. He who shines yonder is the *asvamèdha*; the year is his body. This *agni*, (its) aid, is *arka*; of it these worlds are the limbs. These two, *agni* and sun, are *arka* and *asvamedha*. He again becomes only one god—Death. He conquers further

death ; death does not reach him ; death becomes his self ; he becomes one with these deities.

Now is stated what *Hiranyagarbha* did, being mindful of that body. *Sah akāmayata*=He desired. How? *médhyam*=fit for sacrifice. *idam mé*=this (body) of me. *syāt*=may become. Further, considering that he may become possessed of a body (*ātmanvi syāmanēti*), he entered it. Since (*yat*) from his body, which through his desertion, losing its fame and strength, became swollen (*aśvat=aśvayat*), it became (known as) *aśva* (horse). The horse is extolled by being thus represented as *Virāj*. Since also, through his entry, the body which had lost its fame and strength and had become impure, became pure and fit for sacrifice (*médhyam*), the horse-sacrifice (i.e., *Virāj*)¹ is termed *aśvamedha*. A sacrifice means action, aids and end and it is extolled by being represented as *Virāj*.

That the horse which is helpful in the performance of the rite is *Virāj* himself, has already been stated (i, 1). Now follows the collective meditation, as being the sacrifice and

1. *Kratóstadātmakasya prajāpateriti yadvat.* (A).

its fruit, on the sacrificial horse and on the above described *agni* which is identical with *Prajapati*. In *Brāhmaṇa* 1 we find no predicate indicating an injunction, but a predicate is needed; we thus conclude that this must be the aim of the section. *Ya evam énam veda*=whoever meditates upon the horse and *arka*, as described above and as characterised by features, presently to be mentioned as common. *ésha ha vai* i.e., he alone. *aśva-médham*=the horse-sacrifice. *veda*=knows. None else knows it. What is meant is that we should thus meditate upon (the horse-sacrifice). How? First the meditation on the animal is described—*Hiranyagarbha* desiring to perform the great sacrifice transformed himself into the sacrificial animal and without controlling (*anavarudhya*) it (*tam*)—thus born—by means of reins, reflected (*amanyata*). *tam*=it. *samvatsarasya parastát* i.e. after the completion of a year. *átmané*=for himself. *dlabhata*=killed, consecrating it for *Prajapati*. *paśūn*=(other) animals—tame and wild. *devat-ābhyah*=among the gods. *pratyauhat*=appropriately distributed. Because *Hiranyagarbha* thought thus, others also should fancy themselves as identical with the sacrificial animal and meditate as follows—‘while being purified, I am of all gods; while being killed, I am of myself. Other animals are offered to other gods who are my own limbs.’ Hence priests now purify in the

same manner (the horse), consecrating it to all gods and kill it, consecrating to *Prajapati*. The rite which is performed with the aid of the horse is now represented as its very fruit. *esha ha vai aṣvamedhaḥ*=yonder is he, the *aṣvamedha*. Who is it? *Ya esha tapati* i.e., he who shines i.e., the sun who illumines the universe by his radiance. *tasya*=of it which is the sacrifice as well as its fruit. *samvatsaraḥ*=a period of time—the year. *ātmā*=body—since the year is due to (the motion of) the sun. The aid of the self-same sacrifice, viz. the sacrificial altar (*ayam agniḥ*), is *arka*. (*Vide* Note 1 p. 43.) *tasya*=of that *agni* of the altar, helpful in the performance of the sacrifice. *imē lōkāḥ*—the three worlds (heaven, earth and the interspace). *ātmānaḥ*—i.e., are limbs or parts of the body. So has it been already stated in passage 3. *Agni* and the sun, as described above, are *arka* and *aṣvamedha*—the sacrifice and its fruit. The altar made of earth *arka* is the rite because it aids the rite. The fruit is brought about by the rite and the sun (the fruit) is therefore described as the horse-sacrifice itself. The two—means and end—*agni* and the sun, again (*punaḥ*) become (*bhavati*) one god only (*ēkaiva dēvatā*). Who is it? *mṛtyurēva* Death himself. He was single originally but became threefold in order to become the rite, its means as well as its end. (see ii 3) When the rite was

over, he became one again, viz. Death as the fruit. Whoever meditates on this sacrifice and Death as one god, thinking—'I myself am Death, the horse-sacrifice—one god only—with myself as the horse and as the altar—the means as well as the end'—he defeats future death (*punar mṛtyum apajayāti.*) Having died once, he will not be born again to die. Although he may avoid death, death may reach him. To deny this contingency the text adds—*nainam mṛtyurāpnoti*=Death does not get at him. Why? Because Death becomes the self of such a knower (*mṛtyurasyatmā bhavati*). Moreover, being Death—the fruit—he becomes one with these deities. This fruit is to one (that meditates as described above.)

THIRD BRÂHMAṆA.

How is this section related (to the previous one)? By describing the fruit of the *aṣvamédha*, has been indicated the highest position attainable by *karma*, combined with meditation, viz. identity with *mṛtyu* or *Hiranyagarbha*. And now the *Udgitha Brâhmaṇa* (as the present section is known) is begun in order to show from what source proceed *karma* and meditation, the means of securing identity with *mṛtyu* or *Hiranyagarbha*.

Well, in the former section the result was stated to be the *attainment of identity with mṛtyu*; but (here), on the other hand, the result of *karma* combined with meditation upon the *Udgitha* is declared to be the *overcoming of mṛtyu* (iii 12 et seq.). Since there is thus a difference between the two results, (one may think that) it is not right to say that (the present section) is for pointing out the source of *karma* and meditation, mentioned in the previous one. This objection is not valid for the result of the meditation upon the *Udgitha* is the attainment of identity with *Agni* and *Âditya*—the same result as was mentioned above. Compare 'He becomes one with these gods' (ii, 7).

Is it not inconsistent (with what has been stated in the previous section) to say (in this section) 'having overcome *mṛtyu*'? No: for *overcoming* here is of '*mṛtyu*' in the sense of 'natural attachment for material objects' (and not in the sense of '*Hiranyagarbha*').

What is this *mṛtyu* which is described as 'natural attachment for material objects'? Whence does it arise? By what means can it be overcome? And how? The following allegory is for furnishing answers to these questions—

1. Of two kinds (were) the sons of the *Virāj*—the *dēvas* and the *asuras*. So the *dēvas* were fewer and the *asuras* more. They vied with each other for these worlds. The *dēvas* said: 'Oh, let us overcome the *asuras* in the sacrifice by the *udgîtha*'.

Dvayāḥ = of two kinds. *ha*—a particle referring to what took place in olden times. This particle here indicates what happened in a previous existence of the present *Virāj*. *prājāpatyaḥ* i.e., the sons of *Virāj* in his previous birth. Who are they? *devāḥ cha asurāḥ cha*—the *dēvas* and

the *asuras* viz, the senses of *Virāj*, such as that of speech. How can they be termed *dēvas* and *asuras*? They are *devas* when they are devoted to *karma* and meditation as understood through the scripture, because they then *shine forth*. They become *asuras* when they are devoted to thoughts and deeds directed towards the attainment of 'visible' results as determined by ordinary perception and reasoning. They are then termed *asuras* because they *delight* (*ramante*) in (the present) life (*asu*)¹ or because *they are opposed* (*a-*) to the *dēvas* (*sura*). Since the *asuras* are intent upon deeds and thoughts leading to visible results (*tatah*), the *dēvas* are necessarily less numerous (*kāniyasā éva = kaniyāmsa éva*); and the *asuras*, more numerous (*jyāyasāh*)². The tendency of the senses to do deeds and think thoughts according to natural promptings is, as is well-known, stronger than the tendency to perform rites or practise meditation as prescribed in the scripture; for the former yield *visible* results. The *devas* are consequently fewer. *Sāstraic* activity is small, for it means great effort.

1. 'Delighting in the present life' means 'being self-indulgent', (A).

2. This statement is based on the fact that ordinarily the sensory activities (including those of the mind), as determined by right influences, are less numerous than those determined by evil influences.

Te=the *dévas* and the *asuras*, existing in the body of the *Viráj*. *eshu lokeshu i.e.*, for these worlds, attainable through deeds and thoughts—ordinary as well as *sástraic*. *asparadhanta*=rivalled with each other. Rivalry here means the appearance or disappearance of the tendency characteristic of the *dévas* and the *asuras*. Sometimes the senses become actuated by ideas relating to *sástraic karma* and meditation. When this happens, then disappears the evil tendency of the senses to be inspired by deeds and thoughts, which according to perception and inference, lead to visible results. That is success for the *dévas* and defeat for the *asuras*. Sometimes the good tendency disappears and the evil one appears (in its place). That is success for the *asuras* and defeat for the *dévas*. Accordingly when the *devas* succeed, merit predominates and ascent in life, up to the (position of) *Viráj*, is the result. When the *asuras* succeed, demerit predominates and descent in life, down to the immoveable is the result. When the two (merit and demerit) are equal, one is born as a man. What did the *dévas*, who being few were threatened by the *asuras*, do—the *asuras* being greater in number? *te devdḥ*—those *devas*, threatened by the *asuras*. *ha*=it is said. *ūchuh*=said. *yajñe*—in this *jyotishtoma* sacrifice. *Udgithena i.e.*, by becoming one with the chanter of the *udgitha* (*i.e.*, *Prāna*). *atyayāma*=get beyond.

(the *asuras*). That is: they said to one another — 'Vanquishing the *asuras*, let us realise divinity, which is ours, as stated in the scripture'. The attainment of identity with the chanter of the *Udgitha* (*Prāṇa*) is through *karma* and meditation. The *karma* is what will presently be enjoined¹ viz. the repetition in an undertone (*japa*) of certain *mantras*². The meditation is what is being described.

Objection: What is being described is not a meditation, but only a glorification of what is subsidiary to the *abhyāroha-japa*³.

Answer: Not so: for we have in the text 'Whoever meditates thus' (*Kandika* 7).

Objection: (If it is not subsidiary to the *japa*) it must have reference to the injunction about the *udgitha*, because we find the legend narrated in connection with the *udgitha*.

Answer: Not so (either), for this is not the section of the *udgitha* at all, which is dealt with elsewhere. This is the knowledge-section (and so what is described here must refer to meditation).

1. See *Kandika* 28.

2. *Japa* is regarded as a '*Karma*' because it is a *kriyā*.

3. The *Japa* is so called because it leads one up to divinity. *Ābhimukhyena ārohati devabhāvam aneneti* (A), *Vide Kandika*: 28.

(It cannot be subsidiary to the injunction about the *japa*), for the *japa* is not independent, as is clear from the fact that it is to be practised (only) by one who has meditated (upon *Prāṇa*) in the described manner. The meditation itself, on the other hand, is represented in the scripture as being independent and standing by itself. Moreover (this meditation cannot be subsidiary for), by itself, it is declared to yield a fruit¹. (That *Prāṇa* is intended to be meditated upon) is further evident from the fact that it is praised² as pure, while speech &c are described as impure. If *Prāṇa* were not intended to be the object of meditation, the statements, viz that *Prāṇa* is pure, that speech &c., alluded to along with it, are impure, and the exaltation of *Prāṇa*, implied by the disparagement of speech &c, would be all out of place. So also would be the declaration of a result (following from the meditation) in 'He shines overcoming death &c.' (*Kandikā* 12). The identification of speech &c, with *Agni* &c is a consequence of becoming one with *Prāṇa*.

Objection: (If so), let *Prāṇa* be the object of meditation, but you cannot say it (actually) possesses features like purity.

Siddhāntin's Question: Well, should it not

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1. Vide *Kandikā* 28.
 2. Compare:—*yaddhi stūyate tadvidhīyate*.

B. 5

(possess these features in reality) because of the scriptural statment (that it does).?

Opponent's Answer: No: for *Prāṇa* being the object of meditation, (these features predicated of it) may well be merely for its glorification.

Siddhāntin's Answer: That cannot be so¹ for, as is evident from experience, correct knowledge alone can lead to our well-being. By correct apprehension one obtains in life what is good and avoids what is evil,—not by incorrect apprehension. Similarly in the present case our well-being can result (only) if we understand from the words of the scripture what they (actually) signify; not otherwise. Besides there is no authority for assuming that the notion, arising from the expressly stated words of the scripture relating to meditations, is untrue. Nor, indeed, is there a denial anywhere of *Prāṇa* being pure. Thus we should understand the scriptural words literally—for they point to our well-being as the result. The opposite course is well-known as leading to evil. We find in life that one who misapprehends a thing—say, a post to be a man, or an enemy to be a friend—meets with evil.

1. The *Siddhāntin*, no doubt, admits that the statement in the *Sruti* that *Prāṇa* is pure is for glorifying *Prāṇa*. Although it glorifies, it need not be untrue. It is an *arthavāda* but a *bhūtarthavāda*. *Stutirāpi yathārthāivētyarthah*. (A)

If the scripture (when it describes for our meditation or for our knowing) the character of the Self, the Supreme Lord, the gods and so forth, describes only what is unreal, then from what we know in life, we should conclude that the scripture is for bringing about evil—a (conclusion) which is disagreeable (to us both).¹ Therefore (we must admit that) the scripture teaches—for our meditation (and for our knowing²)—the Self, the Supreme Lord, the gods &c—all really existing entities.

Objection: The scripture asks us to regard names³ and the like as Brahman. It is evident that these are not Brahman; yet the scripture asks us to regard them as Brahman, which is equivalent to asking us to regard a post as a man. Thus it is not right to say that wherever the Veda means our well-being, it describes things as they are.

Answer: That is not so, for (in regard to names &c) as in the case of the idol (worshipped

1. This is said in reference to a certain section of the *Mīmāṃsakas*, known as the *Prābhākaras* who maintain that Vedic statements regarding the Self &c are not to be understood *literally* and as alluding to *really existent* things. They are *arthavādas* or explanations intended to stimulate interest in Vedic rites.

2. *Jñānārtham chēti śēshah*. (A)

3. See *Chāndogyaopanishad*: vii, 1, 5. 'Names' here means 'words'—secular or Vedic.

as a god) the difference is evident. You are not right in observing that the Veda teaches a misconception—on all fours with regarding a post as a man—when it asks us to think of names and the like which are not Brahman, as Brahman.

Question: Why?

Answer: Because as in the case of viewing an idol as *Vishnu*, the Veda teaches the regarding as Brahman of names &c, to one that clearly knows them to be distinct from it. As in the case of the idol, names &c are utilised as aids only (in meditation) and it does not mean that the names &c are themselves Brahman. A post, when not recognised as such is mistaken, say, for a man; then it is not taken to be a post at all. The regarding of names &c as Brahman is not a misconception in this sense.

Objection: (Meditating upon anything) as Brahman must be a pure fancy for there is no Brahman at all¹, and the regarding of an idol as a god—*Vishnu*, for example,—or viewing Brahmins (invited to a *śrāddha*) as *pitrs* is on

1. This is the view of the *Mīmāṃsakas* who, although they believe in the authority of the Veda, do not grant that there is anything like Brahman taught in the Veda as actually existing. They understand the *Upanishads* as subsidiary to the *Karmakāṇḍa* and not as containing an independent theory of life.

a par with this.¹

Answer: It is not so, for we are asked (e.g. in *Ch. Up.* i, 6.) to regard *Rik* &c. as *Prthivī* &c. In other words, the scripture enjoins on us to regard *Rik* &c as *Prthivī* &c which are actually existent. On this analogy, the fancying of Brahman in names &c, must imply that Brahman exists and it should similarly be conceded that while we regard an idol as a god, for example, or Brahmins as *pitrs*, we superimpose only existing objects. Moreover, a secondary sense implies a primary one. For example the *panch-dgnis* (*Vide Ch: Up: v*) are thought of as fire only in a secondary sense and there is *Agni* in the primary sense of the word. Similarly 'name-Brahman', being Brahman in a secondary sense, must imply the existence of Brahman in the primary sense of the word.

Further (passages) referring to knowledge cannot be (in this respect) different from passages relating to *karma*. That rites like the *Darśapūrṇamdsau* yield particular results, have to be performed in particular ways and their several parts come in a particular order is beyond our experience, being unknown through perception or inference. They are (yet) true, being known from Vedic statements. In the same manner, the Veda mentions

1. See note 1. p. 67.

the Self, the Supreme Lord, the gods &c. and describes them as 'not gross', 'transcending hunger' &c. These also being supersensuous and beyond perception and inference must be regarded as true (from Vedic testimony itself). So far as the impression produced by them is concerned, there is no difference between passages relating to *karma* and those relating to *jñāna*. Nor is the knowledge conveyed by them about the Supreme Lord &c., either inconclusive or absurd.

Objection: Passages relating to *karma*, although referring to supersensuous matters, prescribe the *doing* of certain actions¹, determining their three essentials². There is not mentioned in the same manner, anything to be *done* in passages relating to the knowledge of the Self, the Supreme Lord, &c. Hence you cannot say that the two sets of passages stand on the same footing.

Answer: That is not so; because knowledge is of an *existing* thing (while *karma* is something to be *produced* hereafter.) An action with its details—its means and its ends—which is to be performed is (regarded as) right, not because it can be *done*, but because it is known through proper testimony (viz, of the Veda).

1. *Bhāṭṭur bhavānukūlavṛddhā bhāvanā.*

2. What has to be done? By what means? And how?—*Kim, kēna, katham.*

Again the notion that these are to be performed is (regarded as) correct, not because it refers to what *can be performed*—

Question: What then?

Answer: but solely because it is taught by Vedic statements. When a person knows a matter as true, through Vedic testimony, he will do it, *if it admit of being done; if it does not admit of being done*, he will not think of doing it.

Objection: No statement can be an authority, if it does not involve an action¹. If no action is intended, the words that form the sentence do not construe together at all; if, on the other hand, an action is intended, the words can be construed as referring to that action—‘Such and such an action should be done through such and such means in such and such a manner’. Sentences like this, referring to the doing of an action may be an authority, but, when bereft of imperatives like ‘*kuryāt, kriyēta, kartavyam, bhavēt, syāt*’, not even a hundred words like ‘Such and such, through such and such means and in such and such a manner’, can serve,

1. The *Mīmāṃsakas* maintain that a sentence to yield a meaning must have—explicitly stated or implicit—a predicate with an imperative sense. Predicates like *asti* do not give to a sentence the power to convey any useful meaning.

by themselves, as acceptable testimony. Hence the Self, the Supreme Lord &c. cannot be established as existing by Vedic statements (in the form of sentences). No one can say that if Brahman cannot be taught by means of a Vedic *vākya* or sentence, it may be taught by means of a Vedic *pada* or word, inasmuch as a *padārtha*¹ or what is denoted by a single word, can only be known through modes of testimony other (than that of *śabda* or revelation.) Hence what you say is wrong.

Answer : That cannot be so ; for we find sentences used in regard to facts not involving action, as for example, 'There is the *Mēru* mountain, coloured in four ways'². When we hear such a sentence, we do not think of the *Mēru* and the like as something to be performed. Simi-

1. All revealed knowledge should satisfy the condition laid down in the Introduction to the *Bhāṣya*, viz that it should refer to what is true and that it should not be knowable through perception or inference. Such knowledge can be communicated only by means of sentences like *Tat tvam asi* and not by single words. Single words like 'Brahman' cannot *reveal* such ideas. Single words when used in the Veda can only call to our mind what we already know from perception or inference.

2. *Suklakṛṣṇalohitamīṣṇalakṣaṇam varṇachatur-
śtāyam.* (A)

larly how can anybody prevent the words of a sentence having as its predicate the verb 'to be,¹—and referring to the highest Self &c.—from construing together as adjectives and substantives (connected with *asti*) ?

Objection: The parallel does not hold, for no useful purpose is served by knowing the supreme Self as there is, by knowing (the existence) of *Méru*.

Answer: Not so; for there are declarations of the purpose served (by the knowledge of the Self) in passages like—'Who knows Brahman reaches the highest.' (*Taitt. Up:* ii); 'The knots of the heart are untied.' (*Mundaka Up:* iv). Moreover (knowers of the Self) actually experience the disappearance of the rooted deficiency of ignorance—the cause of mundane existence². This knowledge is not subsidiary to anything else and it would not therefore be right, or the basis that a specific fruit is said to result from it, to regard it as an *arthavāda* or explanatory passage, as is done, for instance in the case of the ladle³.

1. For example the *Upanishadic* sentence—*Tat tvam asi. Ch. Up:* vi, 8, 7, *et. seq.*

2. *Vidvadanubhavadviródhāchcha naivamitydha sam-
sāreti (A)*

3. The ladle is the wooden spoon used at a sacrifice. We have the following in a *Brāhmaṇa*—*yasya paṇamayaḥ juhārbhavati na sa pāpam ślōkam śrñōti*. The declaration of a *phala* here is taken as an *arthavāda* i. e., as not to be

Further, it is only from the Veda we know that a prohibited action is connected with an evil result; but (yet) a prohibition does not involve any action. A person who is about to do a prohibited act (and recollects that it is prohibited) has not to act but has only to cease from acting. The real aim of prohibitions then is the generation of an idea that (something) is not to be done. If a hungry man, who knows prohibitory injunctions, sees before him what should not be eaten, say, for example, *kalanja*—the flesh of an animal struck with a poisoned weapon¹—or food belonging to an out-caste, the thought that may occur to him (at first sight) that it may be eaten will be overcome by the recollection of the prohibition. Similarly in the case of a mirage, the desire to drink from it will disappear (after a recollection of) its true character. When the natural misconception is removed

literally understood. But the same cannot be done in the case of self-knowledge taught in the *Upanishads*, because this knowledge stands by itself and does not subserve a rite as the ladle, for instance, does.

1. This alludes to the prohibition-*Na kalanjam bhakshayet*. It does not mean that such flesh should not be eaten for it may be poisonous; for in that case no scriptural statement would be necessary, the harmful character of such flesh being known through experience. The prohibition means that the flesh should not be eaten, although not poisonous, for it results in a *spiritual* evil. (*Vide* note 1. p. 72.)

by true knowledge, the harmful inclination to eat the *kalanja* will disappear. (In such circumstances) the tendency to act which is due to a misconception has only to be checked and no positive effort is needed to give it up. Thus prohibitory injunctions are intended only to acquaint us with the true character of things. They do not, even in the slightest degree, involve action. The same must also be the import of passages relating to the true nature of the Supreme Self &c. And when one, who has acquired *that* knowledge, thinks of the true character of the Self and realises the evil nature of worldly activities, one will cease to show those activities, for their source—ignorance—will have been removed.

Objection : In regard to the eating of *kalanja*, the recollection of the scriptural truth that it leads to evil removes the first impression that it may be eaten, and the desire to eat it, thereby ceases, *because it is harmful*. But the same cannot be said in regard to *karmas*, expressly prescribed by the scripture, and not prohibited.¹

1. It was stated above that a true knowledge of the Self would prevent the knower from doing any of the Vedic rites—even such as are expressly prescribed, say, *agnihotra*. The objector states here that such rites cannot be given up for they are not harmful; rather they are salutary, having been prescribed in the Veda.

Answer: Not so; for both possess these common characteristics viz, being the source of evil, and being the result of misconception. The desire to eat the *kalanja* is due to a misconception and is productive of evil. So also are the activities prescribed in the scripture. Since actions prescribed in the scripture are also due to a misconception and are productive of evil results, there will be in the case of a person, who knows the true nature of the Self, cessation (from those activities) when that misconception is removed by the right knowledge of the Self.

Objection: Well, let it be so (in regard to *kāmyakarmas*) but in regard to *nityakarmas*, which are binding solely because they are prescribed in the scripture and are not (as such) productive of evil results, there can be no cessation of activity.

Answer: No; for, as *kāmyakarmas* are meant for a person actuated by an ignorant desire for *swarga*, *nityakarmas* also are prescribed for one, who is characterised by ignorance—the root-evil of all—is affected by love and hatred, consequent upon a desire to attain good and avoid evil and is therefore desirous *in general* of being happy and not miserable. Thus (the performance of) *nityakarmas* is not *solely* due to scriptural statements (but also to desire). Moreover in regard to the *agni-hotra*, *darṣapūrṇamādsau*, *chaturmāsya*, *paśubandha*

and *samayāga*, there is nothing inherent in them to make them optional or obligatory. When the sacrificer is actuated by a desire such as that of attaining *swarga*, they serve to fulfil that desire. Similarly in the case of a person characterised by ignorance and affected by the natural desire to attain good and avoid evil, the *nityakarmas* serve that purpose—rightly enough—for they are prescribed for him. To one that possesses true knowledge of the Self, nothing is prescribed except renunciation. Self-knowledge is inculcated through destroying all notion of means, such as that of the gods, necessary for the performance of *karma*. It does not stand to reason that one that has abandoned (as false) all notions of action—means & ends—should set about doing anything, for setting about doing anything implies faith in specific actions—their means & their ends. Nor can there be any scope at all for action in the case of one who believes that the Self is unlimited by time, space and the like, is not gross, not dual &c.

Objection: There may be (room for activity in regard to obligatory rites) as in the case of taking food.

Answer: That cannot be; because the desire for food is entirely due to ignorance (of the real character of the Self) and is not therefore obliga-

tory (in the sense in which scriptural injunctions are). *Nityakarmas*, cannot be done or left undone according to our inclination, as, for instance, dining. Dining is optional because it is the result of natural inclination, as is the case with optional rites or *kāmyakarmas*. In regard to both, there is no certainty when the desire may arise and when not. Obligatory rites are not thus uncertain; for a fixed time is prescribed for them in the Veda. Although they are also due to ignorance, a time is fixed for them as there is a time—morning and evening—fixed in regard to *kāmyāgnihōtra*, for example.

Objection: Although taking food is due to natural inclination, we find scriptural rules about it¹. Similarly let there be rules in regard to rites also (for the knower to follow.)

Answer: That cannot be; for a *niyama* (of this type) does not enjoin a positive action² and does not involve activity. It cannot therefore obstruct the acquisition of knowledge. Thus the rule regarding the right knowledge of the Self, because it removes the opposite notion of variety, nullifies all rules

1. E. g. '*Kālayōrbhōjanam*'—'*Bhikṣhām charēt.*'

2. It should not be understood that such rules prescribe dining as a duty. Their import is that in regard to dining, a rule must be observed viz, never to eat more than twice. *Pravṛtti-prayojanakō vidhirapūrvavidihīḥ; nivṛtti-prayajanakdvitarau (niyamaḥ parisamhkyā cha).*

regarding all *karma*, as do prohibitions—both alike signifying cessation of activity. Hence we conclude that, as in the case of prohibitions, the Veda may inculcate the true nature of existing objects and have that as its final aim.

2. They said to speech : ‘Do thou chant for us’. Speech said ‘Yes’ and chanted for them. Whatever use there is in speech, *that* she obtained for the gods by singing and her (capacity to) pronounce well, for herself. They (the *asuras*) thought ‘Verily, through this singer they will surpass us’, and assailing her smote her with evil. That evil is what (now) people speak improperly. This is that evil.

Te=the *dévas*, having thus determined. *ha*= (it is said). *vācham ūchuh* i.e., said to the goddess of speech. *tvam*=you. *nah*=for us. *udgāya*=chant (the *udgitha*). They took (for granted) that the chanting of the *udgitha* had to be done by the goddess of speech and that she was the deity referred to, in the *japamantra*—‘From bad lead me to

good' &c (iii 28). Here speech and the like are spoken of as the agents in meditation and *karma*. Why? Because, in reality, all thinking and doing are done by these and are meant for these. That the Self is not the agent will be explained in detail in the sixth chapter¹ (iv, iii, 7). In the present chapter also is summed up at the end under the heads of name, form and action all that falls under nescience—from the unmanifest to all actions including their means and their results (I, vi). What is beyond the unmanifest—known as the supreme Self—which is the entity rightly to be known and which is not of the character of name, form and action—is mentioned later on (*Br: Up: ii, 3, 6*) and described as distinct from all manifest forms. As regards the transmigrating Self—the result of adjuncts,—the aggregate of speech &c—it will be shown as falling under the head of this very aggregate. Compare: 'Springing from these things, it perishes with them'. (*Br: Up: ii, 4, 12*) Hence it is right to represent speech and the like as agents in thinking and doing and also to ascribe to them the result accruing therefrom. *Tathā iti*='Be it so', *tebhyah*=for the sake of the gods who had

1. The *Brhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad* consists of eight chapters, but the first two of these are not commented upon by *Sankarāchārya* as they do not refer directly to self-knowledge. The 'sixth' chapter mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* is the 'fourth' according to this reckoning.

requested her. *udagāyat* i.e., the goddess of speech chanted, being requested by the gods. What special service did the goddess of speech render to the *dēvas* through chanting?—That service (*bhōgaḥ*) which (*yaḥ*) is due to speech (*vāchi*) being uttered: i.e., the good that results from speech to the aggregate consisting of speech &c. This is indeed what belongs to the whole (organism), *tam*=that good. *āgāyat*=secured by singing the three *pavamānas*¹. *Yat kalyāṇam vadati* i.e., the capacity to pronounce syllables &c well, secured by chanting the remaining nine *stōtras*. *tat*=that. *ātmane*=for herself, as laid down in the scripture. The correct pronunciation of syllables &c. is the characteristic function of the goddess of speech; hence it is described thus. But the good that results from speaking is to the aggregate and so, it is what belongs to the sacrificer (as distinguished from the priests). *te*=the *asuras*, finding out the weakness of the

1. There are altogether *twelve stōtras* to be chanted in this connection in the *Jyōtishtōma*. The first three are known as the *pavamānas*. The priests officiating at a sacrifice, including the *udgātṛ*, cannot, of course, share the fruit of the sacrifice which is for the sacrificer. The reward for the priests is the *dakṣiṇā* or the fee they receive. But yet, in this particular case, the Veda has a specific statement that the last nine *stōtras*, if properly chanted, will secure an advantage to the chanter also. Hence the attainment of this fruit is spoken of as *vāchanika* or 'known from the scripture.'

B. 6

goddess of speech viz her self-interest in regard to pronouncing well. *viduh*=(thought). How? *anēna udgātrā* i.e., through this chanter. *nah*=us i.e., natural thought and deed. *atyeshyanti*=will overcome and get beyond, by means of *sdstraic karma* and meditation. Having thought thus and assailing (*abhidrutya*) that chanter (*tat*), they struck (*avidhyan*) her by their evil (*pāpmā*). viz, attachment. It means they united her with selfish attachment. *Yah sah pāpmā* i.e., that evil which was planted in the *Virāj's* speech in his past existence. *sah* i.e., (is) that which we see now. Where? *yadevédam*=whatever now. *apratirūpam*=improper i.e., opposed to scriptural teaching. *vadati* i.e., man, even against his will, speaks impolitely, falsely and so forth, being prompted by which evil. In the form of this effect that evil is (even to-day) seen enduring in men—the children of *Virāj*. *sah éva* i.e., what is inferred from its effect viz, (man's present) improper speech. *sah* i.e., what was planted in the *Virāj's* speech. *pāpmā*=evil. The cause, we know, persists in the effect.

3. And they said to Smell :
'Do thou sing for us'. Smell
said 'Yes' and chanted for
them. Whatever use there is in

smelling, *that*, she obtained by chanting for the *devas* and her (capacity to) smell well was hers only. They (the *asuras*) thought —‘Verily through this chanter they will surpass us’, and assailing her smote her with evil. That evil is what (now) people smell improperly. This is that evil.

4. Then they said to Sight : ‘Do thou chant for us’. Sight said ‘Yes’ and chanted for them. Whatever use there is in seeing *that*, she obtained for the *devas* by chanting and (her capacity to) see well was for herself. They (the *asuras*) thought ‘Verily, through this singer they will surpass us’ and assailing her smote her with evil. That evil is what (now) people see improperly. This is that evil.

5. Then they said to Hearing: 'Do thou sing for us'. Hearing said 'Yes' and chanted for them. Whatever use there is in hearing, *that*, she obtained for the *devas* by chanting and her (capacity to) hear well was for herself. They (the *asuras*) thought: 'Verily through this chanter they will surpass us' and assailing her, smote her with evil. That evil is (now) what people hear improperly. This is that evil.

6. Then they said to Mind: 'Do thou chant for us'. Mind said 'Yes' and chanted for them. Whatever use there is in thinking, *that*, she obtained for the *dévas* by chanting, but her (capacity to) think well was for herself. They (the *asuras*)

thought: 'Verily through this singer they will surpass us' and assailing her smote her with evil. That evil is (now) what people think improperly. This is that evil. Thus indeed were all these goddesses. Thus they smote these deities with evil; thus they united these with evil.

In the same manner, because they are (apparently) helpful in chanting, the goddesses of Smell etc. were, one after another, tested whether they were those referred to in the *japamantra* and whether they were those to be meditated upon. The *devas* came to this conclusion—The goddesses of speech and the like whom we have tested, one after another, are not capable of chanting the *udgitha* for they are associated with evil, being interested in acquiring proficiency (in their respective functions). Hence they are not what is referred to in the *japamantra*—'From bad, lead me to good &c'. Further, they cannot be the objects of meditation for they are impure and do not pervade the rest¹. *évam khalu*—similar indeed (are).

1. *Itarāḥ kāryakaraṇasanghātāḥ tasminnavyāpakat-
véna parichinnatvam* (A).

etāḥ devatāḥ i.e., these other gods like that of Touch &c, although not mentioned here, for as in Speech &c we see in them also, good features mixed with bad. *enāḥ papmandvidhyan i.e.*, they pierced these with evil *i.e.*, they united them with evil (*pāpmabhirupāsṛjam.*)

Although they sought the help of Speech and the like, the *dēvas* found no means of overcoming death. Hence—

7. Next they said to *Prāna* in the mouth: 'Do thou chant for us.' This *Prāna* said 'Yes' and chanted for them. They (the *asuras*) thought: 'Verily, through this chanter, they will overcome us' and assailing him wanted to smite him with evil. (But) as a clod of earth hitting a stone becomes dust, so crushed, they perished in all directions. Thus the *dēvas* became (one with *agni* &c.) and the *asuras* were overcome. Whoever meditates thus—he becomes his real self—his

hostile cousin is overcome.

Atha=then. *ha*=(it is said). *imam*=(this), pointing to the mouth (by the hand). *āsanyam*=being inside the cavity of the mouth. *prāṇam ūchuh*=said to *Prāṇa*. *tvam na udgāyati*=‘Do thou sing for us’. *tatheti*—He said ‘Yes’. *tebhyaḥ i.e.*, for the *dēvas*, who had thus sought refuge of him. *isha prāṇaḥ i.e.*, the chief *Prāṇa*. The rest to be understood as before. *pāpmānā avivyatsan*=desired to smite with evil. But they who had found scope (for mischief) in the case of speech &c. perished (*vineṣuh*) when they, through force of that habit, desired to unite the chief *Prāṇa*—not to be tainted by evil—with selfish attachment—which is their natural characteristic. As to how they perished, an illustration is given. *Sah yathā*—the illustration is as follows: *Lōke*=in the world. *aśmānam*=a stone. *ṛtvā*=having reached. *loṣṭaḥ*=a lump of earth. *vidhvamsēta*=would itself be destroyed and turned to dust when it is thrown at a stone with a view to crush it. *ēvam ha ēva*=just as in this illustration. *vidhvamsamānāḥ*=falling very much to pieces. *viśhvanchaḥ*=scattered in all directions. *vineṣuh*=perished. *tataḥ i.e.*, owing to the destruction of the *asuras* and dissociation from the evil arising from natural selfishness which hinders one (from realising one’s) divine nature and by virtue of their dependence upon

the chief *Prāṇa*—untainted by evil. *dēvaḥ* = Speech &c. *abhavan*=became. What did they become?—They became *agni* &c. which, as will be stated later on, is their real form. Formerly also they were of the form of *agni* &c., but as a knowledge (of their real nature) was hidden from them through (the influence of) rooted ignorance, they were hitherto regarding themselves as confined to the individual body. Now because they divorced themselves from that evil they gave up their narrow attachment and, as taught in the scripture, came to regard themselves—Speech and the rest—as *agni* &c. Further, *asurāḥ*=the *asuras*, their enemies. *parā* (*abhavan*)=became defeated—were destroyed. This legend describes how in olden times a sacrificer knowing this scriptural allegory, tested the *devās*, like the goddess of Speech, in the said order, discarded them as tainted by the evil of selfishness, identified himself with the chief *Prāṇa* of unsullied character, gave up his narrow attachment to the microcosmic form—Speech &c.—and came to regard himself as *Virāj* (the whole universe)—microcosmic Speech &c. being identified with macrocosmic *agni* &c. and became the present *Virāj* as described here in the scripture. The same also will a sacrificer (now) become if he follows the same course. *asya*=of him. *dvishān bhrātṛvyaḥ* i.e., evil which hinders one from becoming identified with the *Virāj*.

pārā bhavati=becomes defeated. (The text has) the epithet, *dvishan*, before *bhrātṛvya* because there may be cousins like *Bharata*, for instance, who do not hate. The evil arising from material attachment is a 'cousin' as well as a 'hater' inasmuch as it conceals from one the true nature of oneself. By devotion to *Prāṇa* it can be crushed like a lump of clay. To whom does the fruit accrue? *ya evam vēda*=who meditates thus i.e., whoever like the ancient sacrificer (of the legend) realises that he is *Prāṇa* himself.

Having dealt with the result (of meditation upon *Prāṇa*) the scripture continues the story. Why should we, leaving Speech &c, resort to the chief *Prāṇa* only as our self? To furnish a suitable answer to this question, the scripture continues the story and states that it is so because *Prāṇa* is the common self of Speech &c. as well as of the body.

8. They said : ' Where was he who thus restored to us (our divine nature) ? (and discovered this :), ' Here inside the mouth '. He is *ayàśya* ; (he is) *Angirasa*, being the essence (*rasa*) of the limbs (*anga*).

Te—the senses of *Virāj* to whom their divine character had been restored and who were (thus) in the enjoyment of the resulting (bliss). *ha*—(it is said). *āchuh*—said. What? *Kva nu* denotes deliberation. It means 'where indeed?' *sah*—he. *abhat*—could be? Who? *yah*—who. *nah*—us. *ittham*—thus. *asakta*—united i.e., made us one with the divine. People, as is well-known, recollect one from whom they have received help. Recollecting as people do, they discovered him in themselves i.e., the aggregate of the body and the senses. How? *ayam asye antariti* i.e., he is present here in the space inside the mouth. Men decide after deliberation and so also did these *dēvas*. Because the *dēvas* found him in the space inside (the mouth—*asya*) existing without any specific form like that of Speech &c. *Prāna* is termed *ayasya*. Because he does not feel attached to anything in particular, he united Speech &c. with the divine. Hence he is also known as *Āngirasa* i.e., the self of the body and the senses. How is he *Āngirasa*? Because as is well-known, the self is the essence of the limbs. As will be stated later on, the limbs dry up when he departs. The import of the passage is that because he is the essence of the limbs and does not feel attached to anything in particular, he is the common self of the body and the senses. He is also pure. Hence one should resort to *Prāna* only as oneself

discarding Speech &c. What is *really* the self must be regarded as the self, for true well-being is the result of correct knowledge ; otherwise, we know that evil results.

Some may think that *Prāṇa* cannot be pure. Well, has not this (view) been refuted (by saying) that in *Prāṇa* there is no self-interest as there is in Speech &c. which feel attached to fine utterance and so forth. True ; but *Prāṇa* as *Āṅgīrasa* has been declared to be identical with Speech &c. and thus through them impurity may belong to him as in the case of the person who, although he may not himself touch a corpse, has come in contact with one that has. So it is shown (here) that *Prāṇa* is wholly pure. How?

9. This god is known as *Dūr* ; because away from him is death. Away from him who meditates thus, will death be.

Sā—that—referring to the *Prāṇa* reaching which the *asuras* perished as a lump of earth striking against a stone. *ēśhā*--the same as this ; viz., the *Prāṇa* who is in the body of the present sacrificer and was determined by the *dēvas* as residing in the mouth. *Prāṇa* is also a god (technically), being subsidiary to a

karma viz meditation. *Prāṇa* is the object of meditation since he is known as *Dūr*—the word *nāma* implies that this name is well-known. He must be pure—because of this well-known name of *Dūr*. Why is he known as *Dūr*? *hi*=because *dūrē*=at a distance. *asyāh i.e.*, from the god *Prāṇa*. *Mṛtyuḥ*=death *i.e.*, selfish attachment. Although it is close by¹, death is regarded as far, because *Prāṇa* does not come in contact with evil. That is why he is known as *Dūr*. Thus the purity of *Prāṇa* is made known. Now follows (the declaration of) the fruit which results to one that meditates (upon him):— Death will be far from him who realises this *i.e.*, that *Prāṇa* is pure as described in the scripture. *Upāsana* means reaching by the mind (*upa*) the form of a deity or something else as delineated in scriptural passages relating to meditation and concentrating the mind (*āsana*) on it—uninterrupted by secular thoughts, until identity with that deity or other thing is realised in the same degree in which identity is (now) realised with the conventional self (say, the body). Compare IV, i, 2 & III, ix, 20.

How will *mṛtyu* be far off from a person who meditates thus—as stated in the previous.

1. As stated in the prefatory *Bhāṣya* to this *Kāṇḍikā*:

passage?¹ Because *mṛtyu* is opposed to the belief of the described kind. Evil being due to the desire for the contact of the senses with their objects is inconsistent with (the character of) a person who believes himself to be *Prāṇa*. It is the result of feeling narrowly attached to one's own speech &c and also of original ignorance. The regarding of oneself as *Prāṇa* is, on the other hand, due to scriptural teaching. Because of this antithesis, it may be stated that death will be far off from one that realises this. The same is now declared :

10. That god took away the sins of these goddesses and sent them to where the quarters end and set them down there. Therefore let none go to the people (there) ; none go to the end—fearing, 'Lest I should meet with evil, with death.'

1. As a general rule sin is overcome by the performance of *nitya* or *naimittika karma*. The *upāsana* upon *Prāṇa* is neither. How can it lead to the overcoming of sin? The answer to this question is that sin, as here understood, is 'narrow selfish attachment' and it is inconceivable that it should exist when the devotee realises his identity with the universe as a whole.

Sā va eśhā devatā—this has been explained already. *ētāsm devatānam*—of these goddesses like speech. *pāpmānam mṛtyum* i.e., death which is evil in its character. It is owing to the evil resulting from sensual attachment that people die. Hence this evil is called death. *apahatya* i. e., having separated it from the goddesses like Speech who had identified themselves with *Prāṇa*. Because these goddesses regarded themselves as *Prāṇa*, *Prāṇa* is said to have taken the evil from them. (This is only a rhetorical statement for) the separation of evil from them is (really) due to its very antithesis (to the character of the renovated speech &c). What did *Prāṇa* do having taken away the evil from the goddesses? *yatra*=where, *āsām diśām* i. e., of these quarters such as the east. *antaḥ*=end. *tat=tatra*=there. *gamayāṁchakāra*=sent. Well, there being no end to the quarters how can you say 'He sent them to the end of the quarters'? The quarters are here so termed *conventionally*—with reference to the country inhabited by people who possess *Vedic* knowledge. So what is meant here by 'the ends of the quarters' is the countries inhabited by people of a different description. For instance we refer to a forest as *dēsānta* (literally 'land's end')¹ (although it is not really so). Thus the

1. Here '*dēśa*' does not mean 'land' in general but only 'inhabited land.'

statement in the text is not incorrect. Having sent the sins of the goddesses (*pāpmanāḥ* is accusative plural) there, he put them down (*Vinyadadhāt*). We must understand by this that he placed them in the people dwelling on the frontier who do not regard themselves as one with *Prāna*. Evil being the result of sensual attachment must necessarily abide in living beings². *tasmāt*=therefore. *janam*—the people of the frontier. *nēyāt*—ought not to approach i.e., one should not mix with them—conversing with them or paying visits to them; for by doing so one becomes associated with sin. They are abodes of sin. *antam* i.e., the end i.e., their dwelling place described as 'the end of the quarters'—although it be devoid of the people. *nēyāt*—one ought not to approach. It is also implied that one should not approach these people even when they are outside their country. *Nēd* is a particle indicating fear. *net pāpmanā mṛtyum atyayāniti* i.e., thinking 'Lest I should come in contact with evil' Fearing thus one should avoid going to these people or to their country.²

1. This is stated because there is nothing in the text to show that the sin was placed in the people there. That is however the meaning for sin cannot abide in the land except through the people.

2. Not merely he who meditates upon *Prāna*, but others as well (A).

Now is stated that Speech &c. became *agni* &c.—as a result of the meditation upon *Prāna* and the chanting of the *Udgītha*.

11. That god having removed the sin of these goddesses, then carried them beyond death.

Prāna is the destroyer of death, for death whose effect is seen in its making one confine one's love to the individual body is destroyed by the realisation of *Prāna*—as one with all. *enāh* i.e., these goddesses like speech. *pāpmānam mṛtyum*—evil i.e., the death in question. *avahat*—the same *Prāna* carried beyond. He restored to them their respective universal characters—such as that of *agni*.

12. He verily carried the first Speech and when she left death behind, she became that *agni*. That *agni* shines forth getting beyond death.

Sak=*Prāna*. *vāchamēva*=Speech only. *prathamam*—important. Her importance consists in her help being the greatest as compared with that of the other goddesses, in chanting (the *udgītha*)

atyavahat=carried. When she was carried beyond death, what became of her? *sā*—that speech. *yadā*=when. *mṛtyum atyamuchyata*=was freed from death. *sah agnirabhavat*—it became *agni*. It was *agni* before also and became *agni* again after separation from sin¹. The difference—when separated from sin—was only this. Before realising its true character it was not enlightened as now, being confined by death to the microcosmic self. Now, on the other hand, it shines forth having got beyond death.

13. Then he carried Smell. When she left death behind, she became that air. That air, getting beyond death, wafts forth.

Similarly in regard to *prāṇa* i.e., *ghrāṇa* or the sense of smell. She became air and it blows having got beyond death. The rest has been explained.

14. Then he carried Sight. When she left death behind, she

1. One of the main tenets of the *Vedānta* is that nothing can ever become anything which it is not already in reality. Thus speech could never have become *agni* if it was really different from it. Its difference from *agni* was only apparent and was the result of ignorance. True knowledge removed the veil hiding its true character.

B. 7

became the sun. That same sun burns, getting beyond death.

Similarly the sense of sight became the sun and he burns.

15. Then he carried Hearing. When she left death behind, she became the quarters. Those quarters are beyond death.

Similarly Hearing became the quarters. The quarters are those that are classified as the East &c.

16. Then he carried Mind. When she went beyond death, she became the moon. That moon shines, getting beyond death. Thus verily will the goddess carry him beyond death—who meditates thus.

Mind *i.e.*, the moon. She shines. Just as *Prāṇa* carried the ancient sacrificer beyond death, so also it will carry beyond death this present sacrificer by enabling him to regard the pentad of

speech &c., as *agni* &c., if he meditates upon *Prâna* as thus consisting of speech &c. Compare Mudgala Up: iii.

17. Then (*Prâna*) obtained for itself eatable food by chanting. Whatever food is eaten, that is eaten by *Prâna* only ; in it, *Prâna* abides.

Just as Speech &c obtained (advantages) for themselves by chanting, the chief *Prâna* also did. It first sang the three *pavamânas* from which was obtained a result—common to all the senses—viz., identity with *Virâj*. *atha*=then i. e., in the remaining nine verses. *âtmané*=for itself. *annâd-
yam*—what is food (*annam*) as well as eatable (*âdya*m). *âgâyat* i.e., (obtained by chanting). It has already been stated that the reciter's getting an advantage (for himself, apart from his usual *dakshinâ* or fee) is according to the expressed authority of the Veda. How do you know that *Prâna* obtained food for itself by chanting? Because the food that is eaten by people is eaten by *Prâna*. *Yat kim cha annam*—whatever food. Food in general is denoted by this. *hi*=since. *adyate* i. e., is eaten by living beings. *anêna eva*=by *Prâna* itself. *Ana* is a well-known name of *Prâna*. When this word ends in *s* (*anas*) it means

'a cart'; when it ends in a vowel (*ana*) it is a synonym of *Prāna*. Further, it is not merely that *Prāna* eats all food. *iha* i. e., in this food which evolves as the body. *pratitisthati* i. e., *Prāna* abides. Hence (it is said) *Prāna* got food for its support by chanting. The eating of food by *Prāna* however is for its support merely. So there is not, as in the case of speech &c., any chance in regard to *Prāna* of selfish attachment for what is agreeable.

Is it not wrong to restrict the eating of food to *Prāna* for, as we see, Speech and the like also derive benefit from the food (eaten)? This does not matter for the benefit is derived through the *Prāna*. The next passage shows how speech and the rest (came to) benefit from food through *Prāna*—

18. The *dévas* said (to *Prāna*),
 'Verily, whatever food there is,
 is (only) so much; (and) you
 have obtained that for yourself
 by chanting. Make us share it
 after (you get it.)' (*Prāna* re-
 plied :) 'You there settle down
 round me facing me.' (They

said:) 'Yes' and settled down around him. So whatever food is eaten by *Prāna*—by that these are gratified. He who meditates thus,—round him verily will relatives settle down in like manner; he becomes their lord, their chief, their leader; he (will be) healthy; he will be) overlord. And he, among relations, who wishes to be the rival of one that meditates thus—he will not be able (to support) dependents. (But) he who follows such a one or following him wishes to support his dependents, he alone becomes capable of supporting dependents.

Te devāḥ—those goddesses such as speech. They are termed *dēvāḥ* because they illumine their objects. *abruvan*=spoke (these words) to the chief *Prāna*. *ētāvad*—(so much only); there is nothing more. *vai*=verily (reminding what is well-known). *īdam sarvam*=all this. All this is only so much. What? *yadannam*—whatever

food is eaten in the world for supporting life. *tat* =all that. *ātmané* i.e., for your own self. *āgāstīḥ*—you have obtained through chanting. And we cannot bear to be without food. *anu*—after (you get food). *asmin*—in the food which you have for yourself. *naḥ ābhajasva*=*naḥ ābhājayasva*=allow us to share. The omission of the causative suffix is due to *Vedic* license. The meaning is—‘Make us also sharers of the food.’ The other replied: *te*=you there. *vai*—if desirous of food.¹ *mā abhi samvisata*—sit down around me facing me. When *Prāṇa* said so, they replied ‘Yes’ (*tathā*) and sat down (*parinyavisanta*) round him (*tam samantam*). Thus what food is eaten by *Prāṇa* and contributes to the support of *Prāṇa*, the same satisfies them who settled down round *Prāṇa* with his permission. Speech and the rest have nothing to do directly with food. Consequently it is right to restrict the eating of food to *Prāṇa*, saying.—‘It is eaten by *Prāṇa* alone.’ The same is stated in the next sentence. *tasmāt* i.e., since Speech &c., depending upon *Prāṇa*, settled down around him as permitted by him, whatever food (*yadannam*) man (*lōkaḥ*) eats (*atti*), by that food (*tēna*) these goddesses (*etāḥ*), Speech and the like, become satisfied (*tripyanti*). *Yaḥ*=whoever. *vēda*—meditates. *evam*—thus—viz., that *Prāṇa* is the support of Speech &c., *evam ēva vai*—in the

1. *Vaiṣabdō yadyarthē prayuktaḥ*. (A).

like manner indeed. *svāḥ*--relations. *énam abhisamviṣanti*--settle down round him also, as Speech &c., did round *Prāṇa*. The meaning is that such a one will become the mainstay of his relations. He becomes as *Prāṇa* did in the case of speech &c., the supporter (*bhartā bhavati*) of his relations, thus settling down round him. And he becomes their chief (*śreṣṭha*), leader (*puraḥ étā*) as *Prāṇa* of Speech &c., Also he becomes (*annāda*) diseaseless and (*adhipati*) an independent ruler, protecting them all. This result is for him who meditates upon *Prāṇa* thus. Moreover, *yaḥ*=whoever. *évamvidam prati*--in regard to one that meditates on *Prāṇa* thus. *svéshu*--among relations. *pratirbubhushati*=wants to become an opponent. *na haivālam bharyebhyo bhavati*--will not at all be able to support those who depend upon him as the *asuras* were not when vying with *Prāṇa*. *atha*=but. *ya eva*--whoever among the same relations. *étam*--this man who realises *Prāṇa*. *anu bhavati*=follows, as Speech &c., did *Prāṇa*. *yo vā etam anu bharyān bubhūṣhati*--or wants to support his dependents following him, as Speech &c., did, following *Prāṇa*. *sa haivālam bharyébhyo bhavati*--he alone becomes fitted to support those whom he has to support; none other who is independent (of him). All this is stated as the result of meditating upon *Prāṇa*'s characteristic (of purity.)

It was stated (above) that *Prāṇa* was *āngirasa*

for the purpose of showing that it is the self of the body as well as the senses (*Kandikā* 8), but it has not been stated how *Prāna* is *āngirasa*. The next *Kandikā* is for explaining this reason. Until that is explained, it cannot be admitted that *Prāna* is the self of the body and the senses. It was also stated (above) that Speech &c., were dependent upon *Prāna*. That should also be explained. The *śruti* therefore states as follows—

19. 'He is *ayāsyā āngirasa* for he is the essence of limbs. *Prāna* verily is the essence of limbs, because *Prāna* is the sap of the limbs. So when *Prāna* departs from any limb whatever, there alone it withers. He is thus verily the essence of the limbs.

'*Soyasyo.....rasaḥ*'—This is repeated (here) from *Kandikā* 8 for convenience (of reference) in answering. *Prāno va āngānām rasaḥ*—This reminds (us) of what has already been stated. What? *Prānaḥ* i.e., *Prāna*. *hi*—this particle indicates what is well-known. *āngānām*—of the limbs. *rasaḥ*=sap. It is well-known that *Prāna*

is the sap of the limbs, and not speech or any other. Therefore it is right to remind of it as *Prāṇo vai* &c. How is it well-known? *tasmāt*—this word must be construed with the concluding part. *yasmāt kasmāt cha angāt*—from any limb whatever without any distinction. *Prāṇaḥ utkrāmati*—*Prāṇa* departs. *tadēva=tatra eva*=there only. *tat*=that limb. *śuśhyati*—becomes sapless, dries up. *tasmāt esha vai angānām rasaḥ*—This is said in conclusion. It follows that *Prāṇa* is the self of the body as well as the senses, for it is only when the self departs that death or drying up takes place. So all beings live through it. The purport of the entire passage is—‘Hence, discarding Speech &c, one should meditate upon *Prāṇa* alone’.

Prāṇa is not merely the self of the body and the senses which are of the nature of form and action—Of what else also then? It is also the self of the *ṛks*, the *yajus* and the *sāman* which are of the nature of name.¹ It is thus cosmic

1. The body is *rūpa* because we see it, the senses are *karma* for their characteristic is activity—whether muscular or mental. It will be stated in the sixth *Brāhmaṇa* of this *adhyāya* that all phenomena are divisible into three classes:—*rūpa*, *karma* and *nāman*. The first two of these comprehend the body and the senses of *Virāj i.e.*, the whole universe in its static and dynamic aspects. *Nāman* is language—the names of the things falling under *rūpa* or *karma*.

in its nature. By saying so the scripture glorifies *Prāṇa* and points out its fitness for being meditated upon.

20. This verily is *Bṛhaspati* also. Speech is *Bṛhatī*. He is her lord and therefore is he *Bṛhaspati*.

Esha u eva bṛhaspatiḥ—the *āṅgīrasa* in question is *Bṛhaspati*. How is he *Bṛhaspati*? *Vāg vai bṛhatī*—speech verily is *bṛhatī*. The *bṛhatī* metre consists of 36 syllables and the *anushtubh* is speech as stated in the text—‘Speech verily is *anushtubh*’. (*Ait. Āraṇ.* i, 5, 1) That *anushtubh* which is speech is included in *Bṛhatī*.¹ Hence it is right to speak of *Bṛhatī* being speech, as being well-known. All *ṛks* are included in *Bṛhatī* for *Bṛhatī* and *ṛk* are praised together (through relating them both to *prāṇa*.) Compare: ‘*Prāṇa* is *Bṛhatī*’; ‘*Prāṇa* is *ṛk*’; this only, one must understand’. (*Ait. Āraṇ.* ii, 1, 6; ii, 2, 2) The *ṛks*, because they consist of words, are included under *Prāṇa*. How? *tasyāḥ*—of it, viz., *ṛk* i.e., *bṛhatī*. *ēsha prāṇaḥ*—this *Prāṇa*. *patiḥ*=lord, because it is through it that *ṛks* are recited. Recitation takes

1. *Avāntarasamkhyāyā mahāsamkhyāyām antarbhāvāt.* (A).

place through (the vibrations) of the air propelled by the warmth of the stomach. Or (*Prāṇa* may be regarded as) lord (of *Br̥hati*) because it supports her. *Prāṇa* as we know, protects speech, for one who has no *Prāṇa* or breath is unable to utter words. Therefore also *Br̥haspati* or *Prāṇa* is the self of the *ṛk*.

And also of the *yajus*. How?

21. This verily is *Brahmanaspati* also. Speech verily is *Brahman*. He is its lord. And therefore is he *Brahmanaspati* also.

Esha u brahmanaspatiḥ—this only is *Brahmanaspati*. *vāgvai brahma*—*Brahman* is *yajus* which is a portion of speech. *tasyāḥ*—of that speech viz., *Brahman* or *yajus*. *eshaḥ i.e., Prāṇa. patiḥ*=lord—in the same sense as in *Kandikā* 20.

How is it known that *Br̥hati* and *Brahman* denote *ṛk* and *yajus* respectively and not anything else? Because we find, at the end (of the present topic, in *Kandikā* 22) speech mentioned as co-ordinate with *sāman* thus—'Speech is verily *sāman*', Accordingly it is but right to conclude that *Br̥hati* and *Brahman* in 'Speech verily is *Brahman*', 'Speech verily is *Br̥hati*' where also *vāk* is mentioned, co-ordinate with

Brahman and *Br̥hatti*, refer to the two remaining—*ṛk* and *yajus*. When *sāman* is mentioned *ṛk* and *yajus* are left over. Also because these are particular forms of speech—*ṛk* and *yajus*. Hence, it is proper to co-ordinate them with speech. (If *Br̥hatti* and *Brahman* are understood literally) there will be nothing special about the statements in the text. It is clear that there is something special stated in 'Sāman is the *udgītha*' (*Kandikā* 22) and *Br̥hatti* and *Brahman* must similarly denote special forms of speech. Otherwise—if they are not specific—they will certainly¹ serve no useful purpose. If these specific names are understood as equivalent to speech, in general, there will be tautology. Besides in the scripture, *ṛk*, *yajus* and *sāman* are mentioned in this order (viz, the one we find here).

This *Prāṇa* is *sāman* also. How ?

22. This also is *Sāman*. Speech verily is *Sāman*. Because it is speech (*sā*) and *Prāṇa* (*ama*), *Sāman* is called *Sāman*. (Or) because it is equal (*Sama*) to an ant, equal to a gnat, equal to an elephant, equal to the

1. *Dvityaśchakāra avadhāraṇārthah*. (A)

three worlds, equal to all this—
therefore is he *Sāman*. Who
meditates thus upon *Sāman* at-
tains union with *Prāna*,—he re-
sides in the same world as *Prāna*.

Speech (*vāk*) verily (*vai*) is *Sā*, which being
a pronoun denotes whatever is meant by the
words in the feminine gender. Similarly *ama*
is this *Prāna* for it denotes whatever is meant
by the words in the masculine gender. Compare :
“(If you are asked) ‘By what do you obtain my
names of the masculine gender?’ (you should
answer), ‘By *Prāna*’: ‘By what, my names
of the feminine gender?’, ‘By speech!’ (Thus)
the word *sāman* denotes a chant because it is
nothing but a succession of (particular) tones &
produced by *Prāna* (itself). Hence there is nothing
that is called *sāman* which is different from *Prāna*
and speech. Tone, syllables &c are produced by
Prāna (only) and are dependent upon it. This
Prāna is (thus) *sāman*—what is ordinarily known
as *sāman* and is of the nature of speech and
Prāna—*sā+ama*. Therefore (*tat*) it is that *sāman*
which is of the nature of ‘song’ and consists
of tones &c is so termed (*sāmnaḥ sāmātvam*). Or
otherwise—since he is equal (*sama*) to all as
will presently be indicated, he is *sāman*. The

word *yat* (since) occurring at the beginning of the sentence must be understood to refer to *tasmāt* 'therefore' occurring later on. No doubt, the passage does not contain *vā* 'or', but it must necessarily be understood, for the mode of deriving *sāman* (here mentioned) is an alternative one. In what manner does equality characterise *prāṇa*? *samaḥ plūṣhīnā*—equal to the body of a (white) ant. *samō maṣakena*=equal to the body of a gnat. *samo nāgena*—equal to the body of an elephant. *samaḥ ebhiḥ tribhiḥ lokaiḥ*—equal to the frame of these three worlds presided over by *Virāj*. *samō anēna sarvēna*—equal to all this i. e. the universe presided over by *Hiraṇyagarbha*. What is meant by stating that *Prāṇa* is equal to the body of an ant &c is that it completely belongs to each of them as the genus *gōtva* (for instance does, to each individual cow); and not merely that it is of the limited size of particular bodies, for it is formless and all-pervading. Its equality (in all these) does not mean that it is limited to the (respective) bodies (in which it abides) as the light of a lamp within a mansion or a pot, for instance, becomes limited, through diffusion and contraction, to space; for the scripture states—'These are all equal; all infinite'. There is nothing inconsistent in an all-pervading entity occupying, when embodied, space limited by the size of

particular bodies. *Yah evam etat sâma veda*—who meditates upon *Prâna*, glorified in the scripture, as *sâman* because of his characteristic of equality. *tasya*=to him. *añute i.e.*, the following result accrues. *sâmnah*=with *sâman* *sâyujyam*=union *i.e.*, feeling of identity in respect of one's body, senses &c. *sâlokyam*—residence in the same world—alternatively—owing to difference in preconceived aim. The purport is that such a result accrues to him who meditates upon *Prâna* until complete identity with him is realised.

23. This verily is *Udgîtha* also. *Prâna* is *ut* for by *Prâna* is all this held up. Speech alone is *gîtha*. He is *udgîtha* because (he is) *ut* as well as *gîtha*.

Udgîthâ (here) means neither the *ṛk*-section (so termed,) nor chanting (but *Prâna*)¹ for the topic under consideration refers to *Prâna*. How is *Udgîthâ*, *Prâna*? *prâno vâ ut*—*Prâna* verily is *ut*. *pranêna*=by *Prâna*. *ha* indeed. *idam sarvam*=all this. *uttabdham*=supported or upheld. The prefix *ut* (here) which stands for upholding mentions a characteristic feature of *Prâna*. Hence

1. *Naṇ padasyobhayataḥ sambandhaḥ*. (A) Compare also *vârtika* 317—' *Udgîthôhyasurevatu* '

ut is (said to be) *Prāṇa*. *vāgvai githā*—speech alone is *githā* or song, because the *udgithā* (understood as a *ṛk*-section to be sung) is a variety of speech. Since it is derived from the root *gai* 'to speak', it must mean 'speech'. It is inconceivable that it should mean anything else and it is therefore affirmed that the *udgithā* is speech alone (*eva*). *Ut* is *prāṇa*, *githā* is speech, dependent upon *prāṇa*.' That word which singly denotes both is *Udgithā*.

For emphasising the above-mentioned idea a legend is narrated.

24. There also (is this legend): *Brahmadatta Chaikitāṇeya*, drinking *sōma*, said, 'Let this *sōma* strike off my head, if *ayāsya āngirasa* sang anything other than this.' He indeed chanted with his speech and with his breath. Thus (is the meaning.)

Tat=tatra, there *i.e.*, in regard to what has been stated above. *ha api i.e.*, a story is also told. *Brahmadatta* is a name. *Chaikitāṇeya*—grandson of *Chikitāna*, *rājānam bhakṣhayan*=drinking *sōma* at a sacrifice. *uvācha*=said. what? *ayam rājā*—this *sōma* in the *chamasa* (spoon) which I am

now drinking. *tyasya mama* i.e., of me, a liar. *mārdhnam*=head. *vipātayatāt*=*vipātayatu* may strike off. (See *Pāṇini* vii, 1, 35.) The meaning is—'If I have uttered a lie (let *sōma* strike off my head).' How could he be a liar? *yat*=*yadi*=if. *itaḥ* i.e., other than this *Prāṇa*, now under consideration, united with speech. '*ayāsya*—this word which denotes the chief *Prāṇa* refers (here) to the singer of the *udgītha*, at the sacrifice of the ancient sages (known as) the creators of the universe. *anyēna*—by a goddess other than speech—breath. *udagāyat*=did sing. 'If so, I should be a liar; and let the deity whom I have misunderstood strike off my head.' By saying that he thus cursed himself, the scripture shows the need for firmly believing in the (efficacy of the) above meditation. Now is summed up the lesson of the legend. *Vachā cha*—by speech led by *Prāṇa*. *Prāṇēna cha*—and by *Prāṇa* which was his own self. *saḥ* i. e., *ayāsya āngirasa*, the chanter. *udagāyat*=chanted. *iti*—this is the significance of the curse.

25. He who knows what is the wealth of this *Sāman*, attains wealth. Its wealth is verily true. Therefore let a priest who is going to officiate

at a sacrifice desire that his voice may have a good tone and let him officiate at the sacrifice with such a voice—good in tone. Therefore people (who want a priest) for a sacrifice look out for one who possesses a good voice. So also (do people seek him) who possesses wealth. He who thus meditates upon what is the wealth of *Sāman*, obtains wealth.

Tasya—this refers to *Prāṇa* now under consideration. *ha*=(it is said). *etasya*-of this—pointing by the hand to (the *prāṇa*) in the mouth. *sāmnaḥ*—of *Prāṇa* signified by the word *sāman*. *svam*=wealth. *yah veda*=whoever knows. What happens to him? *bhavati hāsya svam*=he comes by wealth. Having thus tempted (the reader) by (referring to) the fruit and drawn his attention, the scripture says as follows when he is desirous of hearing more. *tasya vai*—of him i. e., *prāṇa* verily. *svara eva*=tone only. *svam* i. e., (is) wealth. *svara* is sweetness of voice. That is

as wealth or ornament, for when endowed with a good tone, chanting appears to advantage. *tasmât*—because it is so. *Ārtvijyam karishyan*—one that wishes to become a chanting priest. *vdohi* = in voice—i.e., characterising voice. *svaram* = tone. *ichcheta* = *ichchet* = should seek—if he likes to enrich the *sāman* with tone. This injunction is only of an incidental character. If the *sāman* is to be enriched by means of tone, mere desire will not suffice. What is meant therefore is that it should be acquired by suitable aids like cleaning the teeth, taking in oil &c. *tayā vdchā svara sampannayā drtvijyam kuryāt*—one should sing as a priest having enriched his tone thus. *tasmāt*—since tone is the wealth of the *sāman* and is embellished by it. *yajne* = at a sacrifice. *svara-vantam*—a singer who has a good tone. *didṛkshante éva*—people certainly desire to find—as they do seek a wealthy man. It is well-known that people seek a wealthy man (*atho yasya svam bhavati*). *Bhavati hāsya svam* &c. This repetition of the already declared fruit of meditating upon the characteristics (of *Prāna*) is made in conclusion.

26. Whoever realises the
right sound of *Sāman*, has gold.
Of him tone is right sound. He

gets gold who meditates upon
the right sound of *sāman*.

Now another feature *viz.*, possessing fine sounds is stated. This is also possessing a good tone, the difference being only this—that while the former relates to fine voice, the present refers to what is right as determined by the science of Phonetics. Whoever knows the right sounds of *sāman* is said to obtain gold as the word *suvarṇam* signifies right sounds and gold alike. By meditation one gets as its fruit ordinary gold only. The rest of the passage is to be understood as before.

27. Whoever knows the support of the *sāman*, he gets support. Of him speech is the support, for abiding in speech, this *Prāṇa* is chanted as this (song). ‘Residing in food’—some say.

Now with a view to enjoin meditation upon it, the text refers to another feature (of *Prāṇa*) *viz.*, its being supported in speech. *pratiṣṭhā* is support—that on which anything rests. One that knows this character of *Prāṇa*—its support (in speech)—gets support. It is but right for

one that meditates upon a particular quality (of an object) should come to possess that very quality. Compare: 'In whatever manner one meditates upon him &c.' As before having attracted (the reader's attention), the scripture continues to address him who is desirous of knowing what the support is. *vak*—here means 'the place where sounds are found' e. g. the root of the tongue. That is the support. Abiding in places like the root of the tongue (*vāchi*), this (*eshah*) *Prāṇa* assumes the form of this song (*ētaḍ-gāyati*.) Hence *vak* is the support of *sāman*. Others say that he is supported on food¹; and it is only right to say so. Since the view held by these is not criticised, the particular characteristic on which meditation should take place is left to the option (of the person meditating). Thus speech or food is the support.

28. Now follows the *abhyà-rōha* of the *Pāvamānas*. Verily the *prastotri* sings the *sāman*; when he sings them these are to be muttered—'Lead me from evil to good'; 'Lead me from darkness to light'; 'Lead me

1. *Annaśabdēna tatpariṇāmo dēho gr̥hyate.* (A)

from death to immortality.' When the text says. '*asato má sat gamaya*' (it means) death by *asat* and immortality by *sat*. It thus says verily 'Lead me from death to immortality; make me immortal.' (When it says) '*Tamasô má jyòtirgamaya*', (it means) death by *tamas* and immortality by *jyótis*. It thus says verily 'Lead me from death to immortality; make me immortal.' '*mrityormâ amritam gamaya*'—there is nothing here hidden as it were. Then as regards the other hymns, through singing them he must obtain food for himself. Therefore while these hymns are being sung, let the sacrificer ask for a boon—whatever desire he may have. An *udgātri* priest who meditates thus obtains by

singing whatever he may desire either for himself or for the sacrificer. This meditation is indeed the conqueror of the world. He who meditates thus upon *sāman*—for him there is no fear of not being admitted to that world.

Now is prescribed a *japa* for one that realises *Prāna* as above described. The text has hitherto explained the mode of meditation which is preliminary to this *japa*. *atha*=then. *atah*—because when this *japa* is practised by one that meditates thus, it leads him up to divinity, the *japa* is described here. Since the *japa* is connected with chanting (one may think that) it has to be performed whenever a hymn is sung. The *ṛuti* therefore states *pavamānānām* and thus restricts its performance to the time when only the *pavamānas* are sung. Even thus the *japa*, it may be thought, should be performed when all the three *pavamānas* are sung. Therefore the time is further restricted as follows—*sa vai khalu prastōtā sāma prastauti*—the *prastotṛ* priest sings the *sāman*. *sah*—that priest. *yatra*=when. *sāma*=*sāman*. *prastuyāt*=begin (to sing). *tat*=at

that (time). *etāni*=these. *japet*—one should mutter. The *japa* is known as *ābhyārōha* because when one that meditates upon *Prāṇa* performs this *japa*, he directly reaches his real character viz., divinity. Since there is the plural suffix in *etāni*, three separate *japas* are meant (and they are not to be regarded as all one). Since we find this word in the accusative case¹ and is found in the *Brāhmaṇa*, these *yajus*-formulas should be uttered with the accent as here and not as they would be recited in the *mantra*. The *japa* is to be done by the sacrificer.

The following are the formulas—*asatō mā sad gamaya*; *tamasō mā jyotirgamaya*; *mṛtyor-māmritam gamaya*. The meaning of the *mantras* is obscure; therefore the *Brāhmaṇa* itself explains them. *Saḥ i. e.* the *mantra*. *yat*=what. *aha*=says. What is that? *asat* is *mṛtyu i. e.* natural thoughts and deeds. They are termed *asat* for they lead to absolute degradation. *sat* is immortality *i. e.* *sāstraic* deeds and thoughts. Because they lead to immortality they are described as *amṛtam*. Hence the sentence means. 'Lead me from natural thoughts and deeds. (prompted by) ignorance to *sāstraic* thoughts and deeds which are instrumental in securing.

1. *Yatra svarō vivakshitah tatra tṛtīyānirdeśo dṛṣyate.* (A).

divinity'. The final purport is now stated thus—
'make me immortal'. Similarly in '*tamaso mā
sadgamaya*', *tamas* is death *i. e.* all ignorance.
It is *tamas* or darkness because it conceals
(truth) and is termed 'death' because it brings
about (continual) death. *jyōtis* is immortality
the reverse of the previous—divine nature.
Knowledge is termed *jyōtis*, it being of an
illuminating character. Hence the *yajus* means—
'Lead me from darkness to light *i. e.* make me
immortal', as before *i. e.*, 'get me the divine
character of *virāj*'. The former *mantra* means—
'Lead me from what is not a means (to attaining
the right end) to what is so.' And the latter
means—'Lead me from what is ignorance, in
spite of its being the right *means*, to what is
the *end*.' The third *yajus* expresses the combined
meaning of the former two and its purport is
clear. Its meaning is not, as in the case of the
other two *māntas* hidden, as it were, but is as
one understands it from the words (constituting it).

Atha—after chanting for the sacrificer the
three *pavamānas*. *yāni itarāni*—what others
yet remain. Through them the chanter should
obtain for himself by singing them, eatable food.
A singer who knows *Prāṇa* becomes *Prāṇa* and
the singer who realises *Prāṇa* as above described
is, like *Prāṇā*, able to secure that desire. When
these hymns are being sung, the sacrificer must

ask for a boon. Whatever desire he may have, that desire he must ask to be fulfilled. The word *tasmāt* must be taken with *evamvid udgātā*. Whatever desire he wants to be fulfilled for himself or for the sacrificer, that he can secure by singing.

Thus it has been stated that identity with *Prāṇa* is obtained through meditation and *Karma*. There is no room for any doubt regarding this. But there may be a doubt as to whether identity with *Prāṇa* is attainable when (of these two) *karma* is left out. To clear this doubt the text has—' *Taddhaitalokaideva*'. *Tat i. e.*, the meditation upon *Prāṇa* divorced from *karma*,—by itself. *lōkajideva*=is certainly the means of securing the divine world. There is not at all (*na ha ēva*) fear (*dṛḍ*) of unfitness for the world (*alōkyatāyāḥ*). When one realises one's identity with *Prāṇa*, one does not, of course, seek to attain it again). A person that is already in a village will not desire to get to the village as one who is in a forest may do. Desire always has reference to what is away and distinct from oneself. Desire is inconceivable in regard to one's own self. Thus there can be no fear that he will not at any time attain *Prāṇa*-hood.

To whom does all this apply? *ya evam ētat sāma veda*—whoever meditates upon this *sāman*, with all its glory as described above and realises his

complete identity with it thus—'I am *Prāṇa*, pure and not to be menaced by demoniacal evil of the nature of sensual attachment. The pentad of speech etc., because they rest in me, are of the character of *agni* &c. and are divorced from evil of the nature of selfish attachment, arising from original nescience. They operate in all creatures through (the nourishment got by eating the) food which is mine. I am the self of all beings—for I am of the character of *Angirasa*. I am also the self of speech consisting of *ṛk*, *yajus*, and *sāman* for I pervade it and produce it. Good voice is external wealth for me, when I am *sāman*; internal wealth is vocal organs such as the throat. I, of this character, am completely present in the body of beings such as ants, being formless and all-pervading'.

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